http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/a-junior-officers-perspective-on-brain-drain
Interesting read, he makes some good points.
Interesting read, he makes some good points.
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A Junior Officers Perspective on Brain Drain
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Last: 12 yr ago by Brewskis
I agree. He makes a lot of good points. The part where he states without attribution that junior officers are hearing that the Army is "going back to..." is not very solid. I am not in the Army but I doubt that the actual intent is being correctly conveyed. What is beyond dispute is that the Army and the other servies are "going back to" a budget profile that far more closely resembles the post-Cold War drawdown and "peace dividend" era of the mid 1990s. That is a different statement that saying that we are going to go back to training or planning for the threat scenarios that were foreseen in the 1990s (of which Islamic terrorism was far down on the list).
One thing that is rarely apparent from the perspective of a junior officer is that there is a bias to prepare to fight better those enemies that you have recently been fighting or preparing to fight. I am not suggesting that Islamic terrorism is no longer a threat but we are not going to be undertaking any new overseas expeditions to fight the Islamofacists any time soon. As with the end of the Cold War the withdrawal from Afghanistan demands (in the minds of the civilian leadership) a peace dividend and further drawdown.
As an example of what I mean, I went to the Field Artillery Officers' Advanced Course in 1997, eight years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and six years after Desert Storm. The US Army Field Artillery School was still using their highly polished threat model (55 years of polishing and refinements) for a war with the Soviets. When this was mentioned in a critique the defense given was that the whole world or potential enemies was trained and equipped by the Soviets so we can continue to train to fight against those weapons and tactics. The order of battle in training scenarios at FAOAC were all mired in REFORGER and Fulda Gap scenarios. The notional artillery structure we were using in that training was far larger than existed at the time or since then but the Veterans of the Cold War kept doing what they knew best. By Veterans I also mean the company grade officers on staff at USAFAS. After all, Desert Storm was the validation that their Air-Land doctrine was hugely successful.
What it neglected to recognize is that for 60 years the US military had been perfecting a style of warfare based on firepower and mobility with a budget unmatched by any potential enemy. It worked like a charm in 1991 and again in 2003. The problems really began in OIF with the realization that Shock & Awe ended when US forces consolidated on the objective and it transformed from a war of maneuver and firepower to a set-piece battle with a growing guerilla insurgency. It was set-piece in the sense that the enemy could choose to fight the US forces either at their stactic FOBs, on the MSRs for resupply, or while on patrol. No significant time was devoted to those types of tactical problem in any of the training scenarios I recall from the 1990s (either at Ft Sill, Quantico, MCAGCC, or a BCTP at Ft Campbell).
If we predicate the future structure, training, and equipping of the US military on being better at fighting the type of enemy we faced in Iraq and Afghanistan we will likely fail to identify the real emerging threats. That's not a new phenomenon and we are probably doomed to repeat it in some measure.
My point is that the junior officer Veterans of OEF an OIF will have to learn to train and operate in an era of very sparse training resources like their predecessors did from 1992-2000. This isn't because the Generals want it that way. It's because the money simply is not going to be provided by Congress to do it the way we have been for the past decade. Say goodbye to NTC/JRTC/Mojave Viper rotations where the exercise included hundreds of native foreign language speaking role players and other very expensive tools. It's going to be lean times for a long time.
One thing that is rarely apparent from the perspective of a junior officer is that there is a bias to prepare to fight better those enemies that you have recently been fighting or preparing to fight. I am not suggesting that Islamic terrorism is no longer a threat but we are not going to be undertaking any new overseas expeditions to fight the Islamofacists any time soon. As with the end of the Cold War the withdrawal from Afghanistan demands (in the minds of the civilian leadership) a peace dividend and further drawdown.
As an example of what I mean, I went to the Field Artillery Officers' Advanced Course in 1997, eight years after the fall of the Berlin Wall and six years after Desert Storm. The US Army Field Artillery School was still using their highly polished threat model (55 years of polishing and refinements) for a war with the Soviets. When this was mentioned in a critique the defense given was that the whole world or potential enemies was trained and equipped by the Soviets so we can continue to train to fight against those weapons and tactics. The order of battle in training scenarios at FAOAC were all mired in REFORGER and Fulda Gap scenarios. The notional artillery structure we were using in that training was far larger than existed at the time or since then but the Veterans of the Cold War kept doing what they knew best. By Veterans I also mean the company grade officers on staff at USAFAS. After all, Desert Storm was the validation that their Air-Land doctrine was hugely successful.
What it neglected to recognize is that for 60 years the US military had been perfecting a style of warfare based on firepower and mobility with a budget unmatched by any potential enemy. It worked like a charm in 1991 and again in 2003. The problems really began in OIF with the realization that Shock & Awe ended when US forces consolidated on the objective and it transformed from a war of maneuver and firepower to a set-piece battle with a growing guerilla insurgency. It was set-piece in the sense that the enemy could choose to fight the US forces either at their stactic FOBs, on the MSRs for resupply, or while on patrol. No significant time was devoted to those types of tactical problem in any of the training scenarios I recall from the 1990s (either at Ft Sill, Quantico, MCAGCC, or a BCTP at Ft Campbell).
If we predicate the future structure, training, and equipping of the US military on being better at fighting the type of enemy we faced in Iraq and Afghanistan we will likely fail to identify the real emerging threats. That's not a new phenomenon and we are probably doomed to repeat it in some measure.
My point is that the junior officer Veterans of OEF an OIF will have to learn to train and operate in an era of very sparse training resources like their predecessors did from 1992-2000. This isn't because the Generals want it that way. It's because the money simply is not going to be provided by Congress to do it the way we have been for the past decade. Say goodbye to NTC/JRTC/Mojave Viper rotations where the exercise included hundreds of native foreign language speaking role players and other very expensive tools. It's going to be lean times for a long time.
What I take from the "going back to..." is not budget based (and only anecdotal, so take it with a grain of salt).
When we returned from Iraq the last time, there was a Corps-wide push to "return to garrison systems." None of these was budget-based, it was always briefed as "the way it should be." Pages-long lists of "high risk" Soldiers and how we are tracking them. Uniform inspections. METL crosswalk briefs to all levels that consumed more time in preparing than the actual training event proposed. Trackers sent to battalion/brigade/division three to four times daily with barracks rosters, training schedules, maintenance readiness, "NCO development" programs, dental readiness, etc. Daily calls from the Corps and Division CSM (a topic for another day) about how recently the grass had been cut (No, I don't care what training even you have scheduled today...). Not one of those has anything to do with smaller budgets, it has to do with culture.
Most senior commanders in the Army grew up when there was no war, and the only metrics for success were how good you looked on the QTB or at NTC. Now, they do not know how to command. They know how to control, and how to ensure they have the information used when control was the most important leadership trait, so they ask for it now. They were never required to think or act unilaterally, so they don't know how to command a population that knows only how to think and act.
This inability to foster command over control greatly intensifies the real reason (from what I've seen personally) the best junior officers get out. No matter how good you are, you will be treated (professionally, not personally) like every mouth breather in your year group. You will not be allowed to think and solve problems. And, even if you are lucky enough to work for a boss that commands instead of controls, you will still get the same jobs in order, the same pay, the same awards, and the same promotions that the last place guy gets.
The system is built for people who don't want to exert themselves, and "going back to garrison systems" is a euphemism for making everyone regress to the mean.
EDIT to say some senior leaders. I don't mean to paint everyone with the same brush. My BN and BDE commanders as a company commander were very command-centric. Ironically for this article, they both had MBAs from top 10 civilian schools. Their leadership model is what inspired me to apply for an ACS MBA, even though I knew zilch about business before applying.
[This message has been edited by Tango mike (edited 6/25/2013 6:52p).]
When we returned from Iraq the last time, there was a Corps-wide push to "return to garrison systems." None of these was budget-based, it was always briefed as "the way it should be." Pages-long lists of "high risk" Soldiers and how we are tracking them. Uniform inspections. METL crosswalk briefs to all levels that consumed more time in preparing than the actual training event proposed. Trackers sent to battalion/brigade/division three to four times daily with barracks rosters, training schedules, maintenance readiness, "NCO development" programs, dental readiness, etc. Daily calls from the Corps and Division CSM (a topic for another day) about how recently the grass had been cut (No, I don't care what training even you have scheduled today...). Not one of those has anything to do with smaller budgets, it has to do with culture.
Most senior commanders in the Army grew up when there was no war, and the only metrics for success were how good you looked on the QTB or at NTC. Now, they do not know how to command. They know how to control, and how to ensure they have the information used when control was the most important leadership trait, so they ask for it now. They were never required to think or act unilaterally, so they don't know how to command a population that knows only how to think and act.
This inability to foster command over control greatly intensifies the real reason (from what I've seen personally) the best junior officers get out. No matter how good you are, you will be treated (professionally, not personally) like every mouth breather in your year group. You will not be allowed to think and solve problems. And, even if you are lucky enough to work for a boss that commands instead of controls, you will still get the same jobs in order, the same pay, the same awards, and the same promotions that the last place guy gets.
The system is built for people who don't want to exert themselves, and "going back to garrison systems" is a euphemism for making everyone regress to the mean.
EDIT to say some senior leaders. I don't mean to paint everyone with the same brush. My BN and BDE commanders as a company commander were very command-centric. Ironically for this article, they both had MBAs from top 10 civilian schools. Their leadership model is what inspired me to apply for an ACS MBA, even though I knew zilch about business before applying.
[This message has been edited by Tango mike (edited 6/25/2013 6:52p).]
I agree with the comments about culture rather than budgets and the idea of controlling rather than commanding was a good hair to split.
From the article, I found these points very relevant not just to the Army but to the large civilian company that I work for today.
In my work too, it is more about ass-kissing and networking than job performance. This is epitomized by one individual in my organization. 4 years ago, he came to my office to deliver a presentation. We went out the night before and he got so drunk he didn't even show up the next day for his presentation. But... since he was in the good graces of some powerful people at the corporate headquarters, he managed to move into a role managing 4 people. Then, he grew that role to managing 12, then 15 and then 20 people. Now, 4 years after he didn't even show up for his presentation (I was hungover but I did answer the call and sat through the days presentations), he now manages 65 people in my organization. And to make matters worse, there is a good chance that I could wind up working for him by next year. Talk about controllers - that's this guys M.O. Leadership - that's how I differentiate myself from turkeys like him.
Anyway, the point of my rant is that these things happen in the Army but are commonplace in the civilian sector as well. People hire people who they like, know and trust before they hire people who are competent. And, unless you are one of the founders, good luck at trying to change the culture. That can be effected by a strong leader at the top but how many of them are leaders and how many are controllers?
From the article, I found these points very relevant not just to the Army but to the large civilian company that I work for today.
quote:I work in an organization made up of many acquisitions by a single large company. The large company has tried to instill its culture on its conquests without success. That culture is fairly old school and probably worked when things were simple. But today, things in the Data Center are very complex and we need people who are smarter, more agile and who can see the whole picture and of course anticipate what's next. People who ask questions and make suggestions based on what they know works and has worked elsewhere are met with strong resistance. If they persist in raising their head and asking questions about how to improve performance and continue to make suggestions, they are viewed as difficult to work with.
Andrew Krepinevich (The Army and Vietnam) and Paul Yingling (“A Failure in Generalship”) both were on great career paths that were generally derailed by their attempts to identify Army problems and change the culture.
quote:As Ulysses 90 pointed out, things were good in the 1990s. Early 90s anyway. The US Armed Forces were fresh off one of the most lopsided wins in military history. It wasn't until the later 1990s when the Clinton military budget drawdown really hit home. As a National Guardsman, I had more field training time and had more experienced soldiers than my Active Duty peers at Fort Hood. Two words - "Post Beautification" My buddy in the 4th ID would never go to the field for more than 3 days because they would run out of budget for more than that. While in the National Guard, we still got our two week AT plus an occasional MUTA-6.
As an officer, I’ve rarely heard talk of how great things were in the 1990’s. However, the generals and colonels deciding on the Army’s future who were junior officers in the 1990’s seem to believe that that is the model for our future.
quote:Again, the same exact thing I see in my workplace. Our attrition rate is about 25% annually. Which means that we're constantly recruiting and training new people. And nobody seems to care about why people are leaving out the back door. Especially capable ones. This economy is still terrible so it defies logic that people who we just hired would leave too. Because they're not going to necessarily make more money somewhere else. But... what many large employers fail to realize is that it's not just about money. It's about feeling like you're a contributor to the organization and that you get recognized for your contributions especially if they are above and beyond your peers.
Some top performers will stay in no matter what, but most want to see an evolved Army that involves them, trusts them and rewards their performance and potential. Few of us want financial compensation or other bonuses as incentives to remain. We just want to be a meaningful part of an Army whose future we can help create.
In my work too, it is more about ass-kissing and networking than job performance. This is epitomized by one individual in my organization. 4 years ago, he came to my office to deliver a presentation. We went out the night before and he got so drunk he didn't even show up the next day for his presentation. But... since he was in the good graces of some powerful people at the corporate headquarters, he managed to move into a role managing 4 people. Then, he grew that role to managing 12, then 15 and then 20 people. Now, 4 years after he didn't even show up for his presentation (I was hungover but I did answer the call and sat through the days presentations), he now manages 65 people in my organization. And to make matters worse, there is a good chance that I could wind up working for him by next year. Talk about controllers - that's this guys M.O. Leadership - that's how I differentiate myself from turkeys like him.
Anyway, the point of my rant is that these things happen in the Army but are commonplace in the civilian sector as well. People hire people who they like, know and trust before they hire people who are competent. And, unless you are one of the founders, good luck at trying to change the culture. That can be effected by a strong leader at the top but how many of them are leaders and how many are controllers?
I concur with the money rant. I could leave today and triple my salary, but I stay because I like the team aspect. I also got a glimpse of real-world talent issues while in the b-school, so it's not confined solely to the Army
I chose to stay in past command because my environment there promoted decentralized decisions and encouraged initiative (excepting the last few months of higher headquarters area beautification madness)
I chose to stay in past command because my environment there promoted decentralized decisions and encouraged initiative (excepting the last few months of higher headquarters area beautification madness)
quote:
When we returned from Iraq the last time, there was a Corps-wide push to "return to garrison systems." None of these was budget-based, it was always briefed as "the way it should be." Pages-long lists of "high risk" Soldiers and how we are tracking them. Uniform inspections. METL crosswalk briefs to all levels that consumed more time in preparing than the actual training event proposed. Trackers sent to battalion/brigade/division three to four times daily with barracks rosters, training schedules, maintenance readiness, "NCO development" programs, dental readiness, etc. Daily calls from the Corps and Division CSM (a topic for another day) about how recently the grass had been cut (No, I don't care what training even you have scheduled today...). Not one of those has anything to do with smaller budgets, it has to do with culture.
I concede the point. I have never seen what you describe above and took for granted that my experience in another branch of service was typical. If the "return to garrison systems" is indeed the philosophy then the author truly touched on the crux of the matter.
Anyone read the book "Bleeding Talent"? I have not, but have had it recommended by others. Seems pretty relevant to this dialogue...
I've been out of the game for many years now, but things in the military (and everyday life) tend to go in cycles.
Tango Mike's posts are like deja vu all over again.
Excellent posts - I've seen what he describes happen way back in my day.
[This message has been edited by NormanAg (edited 6/27/2013 9:41p).]
Tango Mike's posts are like deja vu all over again.
Excellent posts - I've seen what he describes happen way back in my day.
[This message has been edited by NormanAg (edited 6/27/2013 9:41p).]
quote:Ulysses, nice comments. IMO, the only significant inaccuracy is with the time frame prediction above. The training environment our that military is about to face will be far worse than the 90's. The cuts are going to stand, and IMO the situation will be much more like the 1920's. Hope I'm wrong, but I suspect you are going to be eating your horses.
My point is that the junior officer Veterans of OEF an OIF will have to learn to train and operate in an era of very sparse training resources like their predecessors did from 1992-2000.
I was among a group that got to meet on Friday with some senior folks from three services who are closely connected to budget priorities. They all shared a similar view of the situation and the assessment of the environment over the next few years was not pretty. One person asked how this current defense draw-down cycle might be different from past cycles. The executive responded by using the examples of the post Korean War draw-down under Eisenhower and the post Cold War draw-down in the 1990s.
The Eisenhower draw-down was primarily a massive demobilization of troops because the dawn of the nuclear age and the threat was something that wisdom at the time indicated could only be countered by high-tech nuclear arsenals. They also had a lot of relatively new technology on hand but the equipment for the Army and Marine Corps was not recapitalized because the focus was on the nuclear deterrents of the Air Force and Navy.
The Clinton draw-down was both in personnel and material acquisitions (weapons programs) but had a lesser long term impact because there was a lot of recently fielded weapons and technology from the Reagan buildup that tided us over through the lean years. The cuts to personnel were less but the as with the post Vietnam drawdown there was some hollowing out.
Today we have a depletion of new technology. We've spent a ton on equipment for Iraq and Afghanistan but that is worn out and not really capable of being used to counter the anticipated future threats. We've spent a lot of money on FCS, EFV, F-35, and F-22 but very little has been fielded and what has been fielded were very expensive platforms in small numbers. The service chiefs have testified on Capitol Hill that they will not "go hollow" but the choices they face are going to force them to do so. The Army and Marine Corps are going to see even deeper reductions in active duty numbers and the claim of readiness for all of the contingencies we currently claim to be prepared to address is going to look pretty incredible.
Of the entire defense budget about 2/3 of it is consumed by various components of the personnel budget from pay to community services to Tricare. The services are going to cut people to save infrastructure and programs. I'm not saying that's the right decision but it's going to happen, mostly to the Army and Marine Corps because they have grown over the past decade and the Air Force and Navy have shrunk even during the war.
I (personal opinion and not told to me by a policy maker) believe that we are going to see the following changes. The demise of the CONUS commissary system in most large bases (there are commercial grocers who have already offered to give military personnel an across the board 10% discount if they don't have to compete with subsidized commissaries. That would cost DoD nothing and save about $1.2B a year). We are going to see the Tricare share-rate increased substantially because it has been frozen for ten years since Tricare replaced CHAMPUS. DoD Schools are going to start closing and students are going to go to off base public schools. Travel per diem will be fundamentally changed and nobody is going to make money by traveling because reimbursement will be made only on validated expenditures. Eligibility for the military pension system is going to sunset at some time in the next few years and all newly enlisted or commissioned service members are going to get a TSP on steroids with matching funds instead. Pensions will probably only happen in cases of service related disability or survivor benefits for deaths in the line of duty. The Post 9-11 GI Bill is going to be gutted and transferability to spouses and children will go away. Community services tuition assistance for spouses is going away. That's my take on the future. I have no idea whether all the cuts will mean that there is enough fuel, ammo, and spare parts to train and maintain readiness for the smaller force that remains but the bills are going to be paid by cuts to personnel and services.
The Eisenhower draw-down was primarily a massive demobilization of troops because the dawn of the nuclear age and the threat was something that wisdom at the time indicated could only be countered by high-tech nuclear arsenals. They also had a lot of relatively new technology on hand but the equipment for the Army and Marine Corps was not recapitalized because the focus was on the nuclear deterrents of the Air Force and Navy.
The Clinton draw-down was both in personnel and material acquisitions (weapons programs) but had a lesser long term impact because there was a lot of recently fielded weapons and technology from the Reagan buildup that tided us over through the lean years. The cuts to personnel were less but the as with the post Vietnam drawdown there was some hollowing out.
Today we have a depletion of new technology. We've spent a ton on equipment for Iraq and Afghanistan but that is worn out and not really capable of being used to counter the anticipated future threats. We've spent a lot of money on FCS, EFV, F-35, and F-22 but very little has been fielded and what has been fielded were very expensive platforms in small numbers. The service chiefs have testified on Capitol Hill that they will not "go hollow" but the choices they face are going to force them to do so. The Army and Marine Corps are going to see even deeper reductions in active duty numbers and the claim of readiness for all of the contingencies we currently claim to be prepared to address is going to look pretty incredible.
Of the entire defense budget about 2/3 of it is consumed by various components of the personnel budget from pay to community services to Tricare. The services are going to cut people to save infrastructure and programs. I'm not saying that's the right decision but it's going to happen, mostly to the Army and Marine Corps because they have grown over the past decade and the Air Force and Navy have shrunk even during the war.
I (personal opinion and not told to me by a policy maker) believe that we are going to see the following changes. The demise of the CONUS commissary system in most large bases (there are commercial grocers who have already offered to give military personnel an across the board 10% discount if they don't have to compete with subsidized commissaries. That would cost DoD nothing and save about $1.2B a year). We are going to see the Tricare share-rate increased substantially because it has been frozen for ten years since Tricare replaced CHAMPUS. DoD Schools are going to start closing and students are going to go to off base public schools. Travel per diem will be fundamentally changed and nobody is going to make money by traveling because reimbursement will be made only on validated expenditures. Eligibility for the military pension system is going to sunset at some time in the next few years and all newly enlisted or commissioned service members are going to get a TSP on steroids with matching funds instead. Pensions will probably only happen in cases of service related disability or survivor benefits for deaths in the line of duty. The Post 9-11 GI Bill is going to be gutted and transferability to spouses and children will go away. Community services tuition assistance for spouses is going away. That's my take on the future. I have no idea whether all the cuts will mean that there is enough fuel, ammo, and spare parts to train and maintain readiness for the smaller force that remains but the bills are going to be paid by cuts to personnel and services.
Great post. I also think those cuts will hurt recruiting big time.
Treating a military job as just like any other job is not going to work with an all volunteer force.
Putting your life on the line in a faraway country, enduring multiple deployments that increase your chances of death/serious injury, frequent separations from your family, etc will not be worth the compensation, medical care, retirement benefits/etc a military member will be offered.
Treating a military job as just like any other job is not going to work with an all volunteer force.
Putting your life on the line in a faraway country, enduring multiple deployments that increase your chances of death/serious injury, frequent separations from your family, etc will not be worth the compensation, medical care, retirement benefits/etc a military member will be offered.
Here's my perspective as a CGO (FWIW...):
The DoD is going to cut personnel costs fairly close to what was listed in Ulysses90's post. I think most people can see the writing on the wall for these programs. I hope I'm 'grandfather'd' in for the Post 9/11 GI Bill stuff, personally.
The DoD will continue to hemorrhage money as long as the different services entrench themselves in their doctrine and don't think outside of the container. I respect the Marine Corps immensely, and I wish my service had their appreciation of heritage and pride of purpose. However, I haven't really heard a valid argument why they need to VTOL version of the F-35 (F-35C). Ever since the Harrier's service began in the USMC, there has never been a operational need for VTOL capes that the USAF/USN couldn't fulfill with their non-VTOL aircraft. And when you look at what is driving factor for the F-35 cost over-runs and delays, it's the F-35C model. Also, the USMC started the new combat uniform fiasco with the digi-cams, and refused to let the other services use the pattern. Now the USAF has ABUs, the USA has ACUs or Multi-Cam and the Navy developed the horrible blue digi-pattern (WTF by the way). I'm not knocking the Marines only here, either.
My service (USAF) needs to learn a few things from the RAF and RCAF on pilot training. I can speak from personal experience on this one. As of now, every potential pilot in the USAF flies the T-6 Texan II, then get's selected to fly either the T-1 if they are going to fly heavies, or T-38's they are going to fly tactical aircraft. I would argue that students that are selected to fly tactical aircraft need more flights than they currently are allotted before going to a line combat squadron, and heavy pilots can probably do most of their post T-6 training in simulators. But, the USAF is very reluctant to change this system. The RAF/RCAF only have to really pay for 2 air frames for pilot training, where as we are paying for 3 air frames.
I could go on for much longer than this on what the USAF could do to cut costs and still meet operational requirements, but I think I'd run out of room to type.
Cheers!
The DoD is going to cut personnel costs fairly close to what was listed in Ulysses90's post. I think most people can see the writing on the wall for these programs. I hope I'm 'grandfather'd' in for the Post 9/11 GI Bill stuff, personally.
The DoD will continue to hemorrhage money as long as the different services entrench themselves in their doctrine and don't think outside of the container. I respect the Marine Corps immensely, and I wish my service had their appreciation of heritage and pride of purpose. However, I haven't really heard a valid argument why they need to VTOL version of the F-35 (F-35C). Ever since the Harrier's service began in the USMC, there has never been a operational need for VTOL capes that the USAF/USN couldn't fulfill with their non-VTOL aircraft. And when you look at what is driving factor for the F-35 cost over-runs and delays, it's the F-35C model. Also, the USMC started the new combat uniform fiasco with the digi-cams, and refused to let the other services use the pattern. Now the USAF has ABUs, the USA has ACUs or Multi-Cam and the Navy developed the horrible blue digi-pattern (WTF by the way). I'm not knocking the Marines only here, either.
My service (USAF) needs to learn a few things from the RAF and RCAF on pilot training. I can speak from personal experience on this one. As of now, every potential pilot in the USAF flies the T-6 Texan II, then get's selected to fly either the T-1 if they are going to fly heavies, or T-38's they are going to fly tactical aircraft. I would argue that students that are selected to fly tactical aircraft need more flights than they currently are allotted before going to a line combat squadron, and heavy pilots can probably do most of their post T-6 training in simulators. But, the USAF is very reluctant to change this system. The RAF/RCAF only have to really pay for 2 air frames for pilot training, where as we are paying for 3 air frames.
I could go on for much longer than this on what the USAF could do to cut costs and still meet operational requirements, but I think I'd run out of room to type.
Cheers!
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