Reading Fehrenbach's book on the Korean War.

Anyone have any suggestions on some reading I can do on what happened to the armed forces (in the name of reform, no doubt) in the years between the two wars.

Obviously there was a big downsizing, but the book makes it seem like the civilian pols did some real damage also.

Any suggestions appreciated.

(Cross posted on History board).

I have nothing specific, but perhaps biographies or the relevant parts thereof of Forrestal, Marshall, Bradley, maybe Ike, and Truman might have some info.

I'll speculate without knowing anything that there was quite a bit of disagreement among the services and civilian leadership in the post-war years as to force size and composition -- too much discussion and not enough clear direction, leading to whatever deleterious effects you perceive. Public perception of the necessary size and composition also probably entered into their thinking. Just MHO.

The A-bomb happened. It was all about delivery systems and funding for such systems.... Air Force had them, the Army didn't and became irrelevant.

The bomb was the great deterrent until it wasn't and NK and ChiComs proved it.

Rabid Cougar said:

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The A-bomb happened. It was all about delivery systems and funding for such systems.... Air Force had them, the Army didn't and became irrelevant.

The bomb was the great deterrent until it wasn't and NK and ChiComs proved it.

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Yeah. These conflicts point out that ground forces will always be needed. And professional ground forces always ready to boot. No more ramping up for these limited non-nuclear conflicts. Things like the NKPA invasion of July, 1950 need to be met and defeated almost immediately in non-nuclear fashion.

When I was in Saipan there were several U.S. Military ships just anchored togther a few miles offshore. I was told these were pre-loaded task force ships ready to be sent anywhere in the Pacific. All they needed was to plug in Marines.

Several things come to mind:
1. As soon as the war ended, there was a rush to demobilize and "turn swords into plowshares". Although the attack on Pearl Harbor had effectively ended the Great Depression, industry writ large was eager to produce goods and services for civilians.
2. The American military, especially the Army, became an occupation force in the former Axis nations. And, we began the rebuild of Europe and Japan.
3. As a military power, we had no peer. There were no apparent threats for which to prepare.
4. Intelligence collection was relegated to HUMINT and SIGINT… there were no spy satellites yet, and U-2 overflights did not begin until the early 1950s. As a result, we were completely caught off guard by the North Korean attack on South Korea in the summer of 1950.

Strong Men Armed said:

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Several things come to mind:
1. As soon as the war ended, there was a rush to demobilize and "turn swords into plowshares". Although the attack on Pearl Harbor had effectively ended the Great Depression, industry writ large was eager to produce goods and services for civilians.
2. The American military, especially the Army, became an occupation force in the former Axis nations. And, we began the rebuild of Europe and Japan.
3. As a military power, we had no peer. There were no apparent threats for which to prepare.

Patton disagreed with this.
4. Intelligence collection was relegated to HUMINT and SIGINT… there were no spy satellites yet, and U-2 overflights did not begin until the early 1950s. As a result, we were completely caught off guard by the North Korean attack on South Korea in the summer of 1950.

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