Jeeper79 said:
Trump gets the credit, but there's simply no way this was his idea.
Really? Well, who's doing it? He only hires the best and brightest right?
Jeeper79 said:
Trump gets the credit, but there's simply no way this was his idea.
Quote:
On that note, I think any prior containment strategies are irrelevant since they didn't work, and Trump is the first POTUS to affect real containment change here.
Windy City Ag said:Quote:
On that note, I think any prior containment strategies are irrelevant since they didn't work, and Trump is the first POTUS to affect real containment change here.
I really don't think we can make any conclusion like that.
I do agree though that the cold war origins of the China containment strategy are not really relevant. I view the strategy as evolving this way:
1) Truman era Dean Acheson approach - Shock and anger at the fall of the Kuomintang. We support nationalist insurgent movements and view China along with the USSR as one of the actors that will tip over the dominoes. China pushes back through its own proxy support in Korea and elsewhere.
2) Nixon era - Divide and conquer strategy realizing China is a useful foil against the Soviets. We coopt them by making the rich. Works fine until the Berlin wall falls.
3) George W freedom phase - Refocus in defense policy now declaring China as a strategic competitor. We attempt to undermine the CPC through efforts to instill democratic reforms in the people and fully recognizing that we need to stymie their military and foreign policy.
4) Obama Pivot to Asia - Building on the W stuff with a formal program to partner with China's neighbors on military and economic matters
5) Trump 1 - Transition to trade war tactics to achieve existing goals. Rollback of Obama era strategic partnerships
6) Biden - Maintenance of Trump 1 tariff measures but reinstatement of Pivot to Asia measures. Much more active bans on high tech transfers and investment in local capabilities to better compete.
7) Trump 2 - Interestingly also kept a lot of the Biden era stuff in place but fired up one more time direct trade measures. Scrapped a lot of the military stance on China inside the Pentagon, getting rid of the confrontational language of his first admin and replacing it with "President Trump seeks a stable peace, fair trade, and respectful relations with China". We will see where it goes in the upcoming Xi meeting in May but we were basically at lower boil tactical truce with China compared to recent national security focus.
Ellis Wyatt said:
Simpletons rage while Trump continues to squeeze our international foes by putting them in a box.
He's the most serious foreign policy president we've had in decades, whether you agree with his moves or not.
Jeeper79 said:
Trump gets the credit, but there's simply no way this was his idea.
Windy City Ag said:Quote:
Trump may not have been the origin of this particular move, but he damn sure is the source for the overall strategy to diminish China and upend the world order to benefit the U.S. and the western hemisphere. He deserves the credit.
The U.S. has had differing China containment strategies going back to the outbreak of the Cold War. Trump's current approach is just a different chapter in the same very long book.
His is of course distinct in that he prefers direct and very loud confrontation but the end goals are not really any different.
Windy City Ag said:Quote:
On that note, I think any prior containment strategies are irrelevant since they didn't work, and Trump is the first POTUS to affect real containment change here.
I really don't think we can make any conclusion like that.
I do agree though that the cold war origins of the China containment strategy are not really relevant. I view the strategy as evolving this way:
1) Truman era Dean Acheson approach - Shock and anger at the fall of the Kuomintang. We support nationalist insurgent movements and view China along with the USSR as one of the actors that will tip over the dominoes. China pushes back through its own proxy support in Korea and elsewhere.
2) Nixon era - Divide and conquer strategy realizing China is a useful foil against the Soviets. We coopt them by making the rich. Works fine until the Berlin wall falls.
3) George W freedom phase - Refocus in defense policy now declaring China as a strategic competitor. We attempt to undermine the CPC through efforts to instill democratic reforms in the people and fully recognizing that we need to stymie their military and foreign policy.
4) Obama Pivot to Asia - Building on the W stuff with a formal program to partner with China's neighbors on military and economic matters
5) Trump 1 - Transition to trade war tactics to achieve existing goals. Rollback of Obama era strategic partnerships
6) Biden - Maintenance of Trump 1 tariff measures but reinstatement of Pivot to Asia measures. Much more active bans on high tech transfers and investment in local capabilities to better compete.
7) Trump 2 - Interestingly also kept a lot of the Biden era stuff in place but fired up one more time direct trade measures. Scrapped a lot of the military stance on China inside the Pentagon, getting rid of the confrontational language of his first admin and replacing it with "President Trump seeks a stable peace, fair trade, and respectful relations with China". We will see where it goes in the upcoming Xi meeting in May but we were basically at lower boil tactical truce with China compared to recent national security focus.
Quote:
The Past: America's Pre-Trump Approach to Trade Secret Theft
In 1996, President Bill Clinton signed the Economic Espionage Act (EEA), which sought to crack down on the theft of American trade secrets by establishing two new criminal offenses. Federal prosecutors, however, only invoked the statute in 96 cases between 1996 and President Barack Obama's inauguration in 2009. The Obama administration significantly ramped up this effort. From 2009 to 2016, federal prosecutors brought 69 criminal trade secret cases, for an increase of 20%over the preceding 13-year window. China was often the target of these prosecutionsin 2015, 71% of trade secret cases featured Chinese defendants.
The United States also attempted to combat trade secret theft in ways beyond prosecutions. In 2016, Congress passed the Defend Trade Secrets Act, which created a civil remedy to parallel the EEA's criminal penalties. Moreover, the Obama administration reached a cybersecurity agreementwith the Chinese government in 2015 that included a bilateral promise to stop the theft of intellectual property from one another. This diplomatic solution marked a promising step forward, although President Obama warned that the agreement's words must be "followed by actions." Initially, China appeared to live up to its promise, as in the months after the agreement, Chinese commercial hacks of American companies dropped by roughly 90%.
The Present: The Trump Administration's Approach to Trade Secret Theft
Since 2016, however, Chinese trade secret theft has once again increased at an alarming pace. In response, the Trump administration has thus far maintained the Obama-era push for more prosecutions regarding trade secret theft, bringing nine such cases in 2017.
Quote:
In November 2023, China agreed to restart cooperation with U.S. authorities to counter the flow of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids and their precursors into the United States. This refound willingness comes after more than two years of China purposefully denying cooperation and failing to mount adequate internal enforcement. China's strategic goal to stabilize the U.S.-China relationship was a crucial motivation, but U.S. diplomacy and actions also played an important role in bringing China back to cooperation. What remains to be seen in 2024 is how robust that anti-drug cooperation will be.
The diplomatic breakthrough relaunching cooperation was announced at the November 2023 meeting between President Joe Biden and President Xi Jinping. As part of the renewed cooperation, a joint U.S.-China counternarcotics working group was recreated.
Why China resumed cooperation
Two factors brought about China's turnaround: 1) its geostrategic calculations and 2) adroit and appropriately tough U.S. diplomacy.
U.S. diplomacy effectively raised the reputational and other costs for China and Chinese actors. In July 2023, the United States organized and launched a new Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats. Although China prides itself on being a tough drug cop and tends to be very active in global counternarcotics diplomacy, it abstained from joining while nearly 100 countries signed up.
Crucially, in 2023, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a set of innovative and powerful indictments against Chinese networks selling nonscheduled precursors to Mexican cartels and the Department of Treasury sanctioned various Chinese firms.
Quote:
At best, what you are describing are tactical moves to accomplish limited goals. What Trump is doing is a global campaign to diminish China and empower the western hemisphere with multiple moves across economic, political, and military fronts.
Quote:
Greer: Trump administration wants to be 'pragmatic' on China
US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer pushed for a "pragmatic" approach to China, a warmer stance than many analysts have expected ahead of a visit by President Donald Trump.
Quote:
Trump Quietly Scraps His Own Playbook on China
The White House walks back the aggressive approach of the first administration, in a dramatic reversal
When Pentagon officials last fall briefed President Trump on a draft of a bureaucratic defense strategy document, it framed China the same way it had for a decade: as the top security threat facing the U.S.
Trump balked and ordered his Pentagon deputy to rewrite it, according to three officials familiar with the exchange. When the administration's revised National Defense Strategy published in January, it offered instead a conciliatory tone toward Beijing.
"President Trump seeks a stable peace, fair trade, and respectful relations with China," an unclassified version of the document declares.
While every administration crafts its own defense strategy, Trump's second is making the unusual move of discarding a policy that was formulated by his first. That bipartisan approach sanctioned by Trump 1.0 characterized China as the most consequential U.S. adversary.
The Trump 2.0 framework is instead a seismic shift in U.S. policy, trade
practices and rhetoric toward Beijing driven by a new mantra: Don't rock the
boat.
Since Trump met with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in the South Korean city of Busan in October, the administration has paused hefty tariffs planned on Beijing's most prized industries; abandoned plans to penalize Chinese companies determined to be security risks to the U.S.; curbed investigations into Beijing-linked hackers; waved through Chinese investment in the U.S. with little scrutiny; and told officials to tone down their comments on China, current and former U.S. officials familiar with the changes said.
Pursuing activities antagonistic to the rival superpower has become further paralyzed by Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick ordering staff that they need his signoff for any China-related actions, people familiar with the matter said. As a result, even senior Commerce officials at times sit by his office
waiting or outside the building, watching for his car. Officials at other agencies pursued a ban on a China-linked router maker by styling it as an order that doesn't name the company or China.
The dramatic reversals, which have alarmed some of Trump's own national security aides, are in part aimed at laying the groundwork for Trump's May meeting with Xi, according to current and former U.S. officials. Many China hawks in the administration have taken to gallows humor, calling the shift the
'Busan Freeze,' named for the South Korea meeting between the leaders that produced a fragile trade detente.
China hawks sidelined
The seeds of the reversal appeared early last year.
At Trump's request, national security advisers from his first term started strategizing days before Christmas in 2024 about new investment policies. The advisers brainstormed an approach that would take a harder line on China's encroachment on American technology.
David Feith, who was set to take the role of senior director for technology and national security on the National Security Council, began work with colleagues on a directive that would more aggressively block Chinese investments, rather than accommodate deals with restrictions, and curb China's access to American tech talent.
But the president later decided he didn't want to pursue many of the restrictions, and the directive was quickly forgotten, people familiar with the events said. Last April, Trump fired Feith along with other advisers who were viewed as China hawks. The council's tech and national security directorate, which had been the nerve center for coordinating administration actions on tech and China, was dismantled.
Quote:
Defense officials are concerned that the US is depleting its stock of weaponry and have asked firms if they can rapidly shift to a war-time production footing, a role American companies assumed during World War II.
Windy City Ag said:Quote:
At best, what you are describing are tactical moves to accomplish limited goals. What Trump is doing is a global campaign to diminish China and empower the western hemisphere with multiple moves across economic, political, and military fronts.
But that is not what he is doing. Not even close.
Most all coverage has focused on how he has retreated from pressure in China in his second term.
https://www.semafor.com/article/04/15/2026/greer-trump-administration-wants-to-be-pragmatic-on-chinaQuote:
Greer: Trump administration wants to be 'pragmatic' on China
US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer pushed for a "pragmatic" approach to China, a warmer stance than many analysts have expected ahead of a visit by President Donald Trump.
https://www.wsj.com/world/china/trump-china-xi-beijing-e247250dQuote:
Trump Quietly Scraps His Own Playbook on China
The White House walks back the aggressive approach of the first administration, in a dramatic reversal
When Pentagon officials last fall briefed President Trump on a draft of a bureaucratic defense strategy document, it framed China the same way it had for a decade: as the top security threat facing the U.S.
Trump balked and ordered his Pentagon deputy to rewrite it, according to three officials familiar with the exchange. When the administration's revised National Defense Strategy published in January, it offered instead a conciliatory tone toward Beijing.
"President Trump seeks a stable peace, fair trade, and respectful relations with China," an unclassified version of the document declares.
While every administration crafts its own defense strategy, Trump's second is making the unusual move of discarding a policy that was formulated by his first. That bipartisan approach sanctioned by Trump 1.0 characterized China as the most consequential U.S. adversary.
The Trump 2.0 framework is instead a seismic shift in U.S. policy, trade
practices and rhetoric toward Beijing driven by a new mantra: Don't rock the
boat.
Since Trump met with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in the South Korean city of Busan in October, the administration has paused hefty tariffs planned on Beijing's most prized industries; abandoned plans to penalize Chinese companies determined to be security risks to the U.S.; curbed investigations into Beijing-linked hackers; waved through Chinese investment in the U.S. with little scrutiny; and told officials to tone down their comments on China, current and former U.S. officials familiar with the changes said.
Pursuing activities antagonistic to the rival superpower has become further paralyzed by Commerce Secretary Howard Lutnick ordering staff that they need his signoff for any China-related actions, people familiar with the matter said. As a result, even senior Commerce officials at times sit by his office
waiting or outside the building, watching for his car. Officials at other agencies pursued a ban on a China-linked router maker by styling it as an order that doesn't name the company or China.
The dramatic reversals, which have alarmed some of Trump's own national security aides, are in part aimed at laying the groundwork for Trump's May meeting with Xi, according to current and former U.S. officials. Many China hawks in the administration have taken to gallows humor, calling the shift the
'Busan Freeze,' named for the South Korea meeting between the leaders that produced a fragile trade detente.
China hawks sidelined
The seeds of the reversal appeared early last year.
At Trump's request, national security advisers from his first term started strategizing days before Christmas in 2024 about new investment policies. The advisers brainstormed an approach that would take a harder line on China's encroachment on American technology.
David Feith, who was set to take the role of senior director for technology and national security on the National Security Council, began work with colleagues on a directive that would more aggressively block Chinese investments, rather than accommodate deals with restrictions, and curb China's access to American tech talent.
But the president later decided he didn't want to pursue many of the restrictions, and the directive was quickly forgotten, people familiar with the events said. Last April, Trump fired Feith along with other advisers who were viewed as China hawks. The council's tech and national security directorate, which had been the nerve center for coordinating administration actions on tech and China, was dismantled.
Windy City Ag said:
This is why the far flung paranoiac realms of social media make me sad. But to your claims.
1) China has been constantly and consistently stealing US IP for decades. Obama did nothing.
https://journals.library.columbia.edu/index.php/CBLR/announcement/view/180Quote:
The Past: America's Pre-Trump Approach to Trade Secret Theft
In 1996, President Bill Clinton signed the Economic Espionage Act (EEA), which sought to crack down on the theft of American trade secrets by establishing two new criminal offenses. Federal prosecutors, however, only invoked the statute in 96 cases between 1996 and President Barack Obama's inauguration in 2009. The Obama administration significantly ramped up this effort. From 2009 to 2016, federal prosecutors brought 69 criminal trade secret cases, for an increase of 20%over the preceding 13-year window. China was often the target of these prosecutionsin 2015, 71% of trade secret cases featured Chinese defendants.
The United States also attempted to combat trade secret theft in ways beyond prosecutions. In 2016, Congress passed the Defend Trade Secrets Act, which created a civil remedy to parallel the EEA's criminal penalties. Moreover, the Obama administration reached a cybersecurity agreementwith the Chinese government in 2015 that included a bilateral promise to stop the theft of intellectual property from one another. This diplomatic solution marked a promising step forward, although President Obama warned that the agreement's words must be "followed by actions." Initially, China appeared to live up to its promise, as in the months after the agreement, Chinese commercial hacks of American companies dropped by roughly 90%.
The Present: The Trump Administration's Approach to Trade Secret Theft
Since 2016, however, Chinese trade secret theft has once again increased at an alarming pace. In response, the Trump administration has thus far maintained the Obama-era push for more prosecutions regarding trade secret theft, bringing nine such cases in 2017.
2) Biden, actually aided the Chinese. Almost all the precursor chemicals for Fentanyl are made in China. The first trump admin told Biden about it - to keep the pressure on (this should have been apolitcal) but the Biden admin did nothing allowing Fentanyl to spread. it was not until Trump was back as President that this issue has been tackled again.
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/us-china-relations-and-fentanyl-and-precursor-cooperation-in-2024/Quote:
In November 2023, China agreed to restart cooperation with U.S. authorities to counter the flow of fentanyl and other synthetic opioids and their precursors into the United States. This refound willingness comes after more than two years of China purposefully denying cooperation and failing to mount adequate internal enforcement. China's strategic goal to stabilize the U.S.-China relationship was a crucial motivation, but U.S. diplomacy and actions also played an important role in bringing China back to cooperation. What remains to be seen in 2024 is how robust that anti-drug cooperation will be.
The diplomatic breakthrough relaunching cooperation was announced at the November 2023 meeting between President Joe Biden and President Xi Jinping. As part of the renewed cooperation, a joint U.S.-China counternarcotics working group was recreated.
Why China resumed cooperation
Two factors brought about China's turnaround: 1) its geostrategic calculations and 2) adroit and appropriately tough U.S. diplomacy.
U.S. diplomacy effectively raised the reputational and other costs for China and Chinese actors. In July 2023, the United States organized and launched a new Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug Threats. Although China prides itself on being a tough drug cop and tends to be very active in global counternarcotics diplomacy, it abstained from joining while nearly 100 countries signed up.
Crucially, in 2023, the U.S. Department of Justice issued a set of innovative and powerful indictments against Chinese networks selling nonscheduled precursors to Mexican cartels and the Department of Treasury sanctioned various Chinese firms.
Quote:
Now this is a serious chess move and Trump just put China in a vice grip. The US was already on good terms with Indonesia but this basically gives us control over the Strait with their cooperation and allows us to run all kinds of military operations there. China is completely screwed without access to Malacca even more than Hormuz, it's their most important access point.