I just spent several hours at B&N going through this book and while it has some glaring faults, it is pretty strong in a couple of areas and probably deserves a spot on the shelf.
Weaknesses: lots of them. He sets a new record for the use of the term "highly likely" and very probably is not far behind. He is guessing a lot of the time but at least admits it.
Another: he has bought into the current rage for ethnic contest which has been huge for a while. Hence, his constant reference to the anglo=celtic defenders. In other words, forget about all the hispanics, Germans and non southerners.
There are others.
Strengths: he leans on early accounts by participants and draws some very sound conclusions imo. For example, I first started getting suspicious about Mexican casualty figures when reading Walter Lord's book forty odd years ago. They are all over the place. I hate to say anything unkind about TH Fehrenbach, because I love his writing style and his weekly columns but his casualty statistics are excessive. Wildly.
This guy does a good job of looking at the Mexican casualties and drawing conclusions. First, they were about 300 killed and wounded. In other words, Santa Anna and Almonte were not lying.
Second, the casualties among the cavalry suggest strongly that there was considerable action outside the walls.
This is where he is strongest. He is the first in my opinion to really use the cavalry commander's report seriously to argue that half or more of the rebels tried to fight their way to safety by fleeing the fort in the dark------and in formation! The location of funeral pyres, the cavalry casualties and first hand reports support this conclusion.
Several other writers I respect have suggested as much but he is the first one I know of to make it the centerpiece of his argument.
He is also pretty good at teasing out suggestions that some of the troops were not as oriented towards Walter Scott as their commander, another idea that has been gnawing at me for a long time.
He goes in too ardently for the whole myth busting strategem for my taste, but he is on to some important points.
He is good at explaining why the long rifles were a hindrance at close quarters and in the dark and why the brown besses with bayonets were so much more effective inside the walls. Outside, the lances did nasty work.
Also good on the susceptibility of gun powder to go bad if left out in the elements. So, the defenders did not go to sleep with their guns ready to fire.
Finally, don't expect great writing. He hasn't got it in him and is repetetive to an extreme. I also picked up a little on a tendency to read the same information for incompatible positions.
I just did a quick read through and if I get around to a thorough review I will post on it.
One other thing: he correctly, in my opinion, points out the lack of military experience or even common sense among the rebels but lauds the Mexican army considerably. I'm of mixed emotions on that subject. If they were so good, how come he thinks so many of their casualties were self inflicted?
