Background: The isolation of the SA government due to apartheid and its need for self-defense did not merely entail conventional weapons. The South Africans had evidence that the Egyptians who had used chemical weapons in Yemen during the early 1960s, had passed these weapons on the African National Congress. The SA government was also convinced that the ANC could/would poison civilian reservoirs as well as stage chemical attacks on SA troops, then mostly white. They were also painfully aware that western militaries were far behind the Soviets in effective nuclear-biological and chemical (NBC) warfare doctrine and decided they would strike out on their own.
They developed sophisticated weapons such as anthrax and obtained viruses such as Marburg under the auspices of the 7th Battalion, South African Medical Services-SAMS (part of the military). SAMS was not just about casualty evacuation and treatment; the 7th Bn in particular was closely allied with SA Special Forces and sought to use chemical weapons to incapacitate and then neutralize enemy personnel.
SA government was concerned about a potential invasion of Southwest Africa by proxy Soviet forces in Angola (MPLA) from the mid 1970s and assisted both UNITA ( a western aligned autonomy movement) and the Southwest African government in fortifying the border (Die Grens) and in providing armed support for its defense. The SA Army invaded deep into Angola to neutralize armored/mechanized forces threatening SW Africa which brought massive Cuban intervention into the region. The Cubans who were captured, along with Soviet equipment and advisors, provided evidence that the Communists were willing and ready to use NBC weapons.
Response: Since the 1960s, the SA government had been researching nuclear weapons and produced six of them and were working on a seventh into the early 1990s. Even more interesting was their chem/bio weapons programs.
A trigger for the use of offensive chemical weapons came in 1985 when UNITA claimed that Cubans had attacked their troops with chemical weapons.
This paper goes on to cite covert ops in which blue jeans were poisoned by SADF Special Forces, knowing that guerilla leaders would wear them and a number of other esoteric operations in support of the Rhodesians.
Obligatory:
They developed sophisticated weapons such as anthrax and obtained viruses such as Marburg under the auspices of the 7th Battalion, South African Medical Services-SAMS (part of the military). SAMS was not just about casualty evacuation and treatment; the 7th Bn in particular was closely allied with SA Special Forces and sought to use chemical weapons to incapacitate and then neutralize enemy personnel.
SA government was concerned about a potential invasion of Southwest Africa by proxy Soviet forces in Angola (MPLA) from the mid 1970s and assisted both UNITA ( a western aligned autonomy movement) and the Southwest African government in fortifying the border (Die Grens) and in providing armed support for its defense. The SA Army invaded deep into Angola to neutralize armored/mechanized forces threatening SW Africa which brought massive Cuban intervention into the region. The Cubans who were captured, along with Soviet equipment and advisors, provided evidence that the Communists were willing and ready to use NBC weapons.
Response: Since the 1960s, the SA government had been researching nuclear weapons and produced six of them and were working on a seventh into the early 1990s. Even more interesting was their chem/bio weapons programs.
p. 33 HSDL LinkQuote:
Eventually, according to a number of sources in the U.S. and South Africa, Project Coast developed pathogens that had never before been seen. Project Coast managed to obtain the Soviet-developed flesh-eating bacteria, necrotizing fasciitis, as well as the antidote. In 1994, the South Africans surprised the Americans by revealing that they had the bacteria and then gave it to the U.S.56 However, claims by Basson and former Surgeon General Knobel that South African espionage agents penetrated Soviet Russian programs during 1980s remain to be proven
A trigger for the use of offensive chemical weapons came in 1985 when UNITA claimed that Cubans had attacked their troops with chemical weapons.
pp. 36-37 HSDL LinkQuote:
In 1985, UNITA leaders made the first of several claims (between 1985 and 1989) that their troops had been attacked by chemical weapons (in this case, organophosphates) and asked SADF for assistance. In the 1985 incident, UNITA guerrillas reported that they had surrounded a town, and the Angolan government garrison had responded by using chemical agents.67 In 1985, Col. Wouter Basson took command of the 7th SAMS Battalion and assumed overall responsibility for protecting SADF and UNITA forces from CBW attack. Therefore, Basson came to inspect the alleged CW attack. Lt. Col. Johann Smith, a SADF liaison with UNITA, assisted Basson and claims that convincing evidence of chemical weapons use was found.68 In a second incident, in 1986, UNITA forces spotted a brown vapor, which they thought was mustard gas, and asked SADF for safeguards against CW. According to Gen. (ret.) Chris Thirion, who served in Angola off and on for 20 years, on a number of occasions between 1985 and 1988, the local population in southeastern Angola exhibited the type of disorientation indicative of CW.69 UNITA claims and intelligence data heightened SADF fears of CBW attack in Angola, Namibia, and inside South Africa. According to Brig. Gen. (ret.) Bill Sass, former State Security Council member and SADF Chief of Operations, SADF had evidence that the Cubans actually brought their chemical warfare program to the battlefield as early as 1985.70 ...
In addition, according to Cuban officers who were interrogated, CW agents had been brought into Angola. An indication occurred at the beginning of 1988, when the 50th Havana City Brigade arrived from Cuba with anti-CW protective gear. As mentioned earlier, reports of CW use by SADF and by Cuban and Angolan government forces continued into early 1989, even after peace agreements were signed for the withdrawal of Cuban forces from Angola and SADF withdrawal from a soon-to-be-independent Namibia.
This paper goes on to cite covert ops in which blue jeans were poisoned by SADF Special Forces, knowing that guerilla leaders would wear them and a number of other esoteric operations in support of the Rhodesians.
Obligatory:
“If you’re going to have crime it should at least be organized crime”
-Havelock Vetinari
-Havelock Vetinari