One thing he leaves out is that pre-WWII IJN strategy for defeating the US Pacific fleet centered on getting that fleet to make a 'through ticket' run across the Pacific to relieve the Philippines. The U.S. fleet would be attritted by air, submarine, and light surface forces operating out of the Japanese held islands in the central Pacific as they crossed, and would arrived in Philippine waters weakened and in need of refit after the long voyage.
The IJN would then crush the US fleet in a decisive battle, enabling a peace settlement on terms favorable to Japan.
Attacking Pearl Harbor threw out this entire strategy (really, Japan's only hope for a favorable outcome in a war with the US) out at a single stroke. It forced the U.S. into the kind of long, grinding war that Japan couldn't hope to win.
See
The Attack on Pearl Harbor by Adam Zimm. Zimm also goes into detail on how the attack was much less devastating that it easily could have been due to lack of flexibility and poor execution by the Japanese.