BQ_90 said:

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still a great victory. If anything it completely exposed the IJN training program and how little they cared about life. Easy stuff like self sealing tanks on their plane. They just didn't care. People where expendable.

And yet we have posters on other boards saying we should have invaded who cares how many US casualties it would have caused. That Japan shouldn't have been nuked.

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When the Zero was built, the performance parameters required were never seen before. It was made very light and agile to run circles around other fighters, and it did. Some pilots even removed their radios to save weight instead relying on their fellow pilots for navigation and communication. But it cost them in the ability to take damage.

But the Japanese did leave a lot of their pilots to die in the ocean. There was no search and rescue (SAR) similar to what the US had in place. US subs, PBY's ,etc. picked up ~500 pilots in the pacific theater. The fact that the US tried so hard to save their pilots was a huge morale boost for the aircrews. Even if they were shot down US pilots still had some hope they'd be saved. The Japanese pilots were left for dead.

I never knew that. Thanks for posting. I wonder why the Japs didn't make a greater effort to pick up their pilots? Even if not encouraged or mandated by their religious beliefs, you'd think the cost/benefit analysis would have been sufficient.

KingofHazor said:

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I never knew that. Thanks for posting. I wonder why the Japs didn't make a greater effort to pick up their pilots? Even if not encouraged or mandated by their religious beliefs, you'd think the cost/benefit analysis would have been sufficient.

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The Japanese Bushido Code did not allow for defeat or surrender. It was in their culture to not accept defeat. So if you lost, you were left for dead (figuratively and literally).

They also didn't have the capability or resources to SAR the way the US did.

agracer said:

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KingofHazor said:

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I never knew that. Thanks for posting. I wonder why the Japs didn't make a greater effort to pick up their pilots? Even if not encouraged or mandated by their religious beliefs, you'd think the cost/benefit analysis would have been sufficient.

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The Japanese Bushido Code did not allow for defeat or surrender. It was in their culture to not accept defeat. So if you lost, you were left for dead (figuratively and literally).

They also didn't have the capability or resources to SAR the way the US did.

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Interesting. I wonder if it was more the latter rather than the former? Did they similarly abandon their wounded in land battles?

Not at all arguing, just trying to explore something I know nothing about.

Sorry for the late reply but just got back in country.

The topic is the fall of the Philippines. What does Isabella, or his ego, have to do with the fall? I can't follow that logic. How would those also come into play with victories in Papua New Guinea or the liberation of the Philippines? He did everything he could for his troops. That is why I mentioned his request to use submarines to bring in supplies when the surface fleet left. MacArthur only asked for this to augment their supplies. Not to be the sole supply of the Army. Marshall requested the same but Hart would not do so. I gave one example of the Narwhal delivering a large amount of cargo in a short amount of time at night. Here are other submarine missions.

January 1942
Seawolf: 37 tons to Corregidor

February 1942
Trout: 3500 rounds of AA to Corr. And evacuated 20 tons of gold and silver.
Seadragon: Evacuated 21 Army/Navy personnel,, 23 torpedos, 4000 lbs of sub parts and 3000 lbs of radio equipment.
Sargo: Delivered 1 million rounds of .30 cal ammo to Mindanao.
Swordfish: Evacuated President Quezon and his staff and took on 13 torpedos.
Permit: Delivered ammo to Corregidor and brought out 3 torpedos.

April 1942
Swordfish: Had 40 tons of food headed for Corr.
Searaven: Had 1500 rounds for Corr.
Snapper: Delivered 20 tons of food to Corr. and evacuated 27 Army/Navy personnel.
Seadragon: Delivered 7 tons of food to Corr. and evacuated 22 Army/Navy personnel.
Sailfish: Had 1856 rounds of AA ammo but Corr. surrendered.

May 1942
Spearfish: Evacuated 25 people from Corr.

Other submarines that sent supplies or people to the Philippines included Argonaut, Nautilus, Amberjack, Gudgeon, Greenling, Tambor, Gato, Thresher, Trout, Gar, Guardfish, Grayling, Bowfin, Grouper, Kingfish, Cabrilla, Crevalle, Redfin, Harder, Seawolf. Stingray, Ray, Cero, Gunnel, Hake.

This does not include mine laying or reconnaissance missions which were also numerous. The most delivered by a submarine at one time was the Narwhal with 90 tons.

My position is that the Philippines fell because of, but not necessarily in this order:
1. The Germany first and hemisphere defense position limited what was available for the Philippines. We were systematically building up our troop numbers, trying to build up defenses in Alaska, Hawaii, Panama, the Caribbean etc. Additionally Lend-Lease ate into what was available. We were also trying to balance supplying troops or develop new weapons.
2. The Philippines were in the middle of building up.
3. The Navy's plan. The Philippines did not have the money or industrial might for a Navy and so it was understood that the U.S. Navy was to provide defense. The early Orange Plans called for only denying Manila Bay. Yet they did not defend Manila Bay. They did nothing to stop invasion. They kept PT boats and submarines in the general area as long as sub tenders could operate there.
4. A lot of politicians, Army planners, and Navy planners did not hold the Philippines in high regard. For some reason 7,000,000 Australians loyal to the British outranked 17,000,000 Filipinos loyal to the U.S. Even before the war the Navy talked about the importance of the Malay Barrier but apparently the Philippines did not fit into this plan. Once war came Admiral King repeatedly talked how we must maintain the line of communication with Australia. This is certainly true once war broke out but too bad they didn't have the belief of maintaining one with the Philippines.
5. In the end the concentration of troops on Corregidor gave the Japanese the opportunity to use them as leverage to get all of the rest of the forces to surrender. This is something I can blame MacArthur for. One of the reasons he didn't like the original Orange plan was because it could an did lead to entrapment. But entrapment could be avoided if the Navy stuck around.

So anyone who blames MacArthur but is silent on the above doesn't know the whole picture.

This is a good question. It was the logical choice of Marshall and Stimson simply because of his knowledge of Asia and the fact that he was already there. He served three separate times in the Philippines. His first assignment out of West Point was to the Philippines. While there he accompanied his dad to observe the Japan-Russia war. I believe Nimitz was there too. Afterwards, his dad wrote a report about it which impressed the right people. He and Douglas then traveled throughout Asia. MacArthur came to know and understand the importance of Asia and it's people. That is also why the Philippines asked him to build up their army and later led the occupation of Japan.

agracer said:

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KingofHazor said:

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I never knew that. Thanks for posting. I wonder why the Japs didn't make a greater effort to pick up their pilots? Even if not encouraged or mandated by their religious beliefs, you'd think the cost/benefit analysis would have been sufficient.

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The Japanese Bushido Code did not allow for defeat or surrender. It was in their culture to not accept defeat. So if you lost, you were left for dead (figuratively and literally).

They also didn't have the capability or resources to SAR the way the US did.

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I lean towards the latter playing the bigger role in this, though I agree they both have an impact. In general the US had such a resource advantage that they could dedicate PBY's and subs to go after pilots in a way that the Japanese just couldn't. There are times when they did use subs etc for this but its a big risk when you only have so many subs and can only count on building a small number more. Meanwhile the US can crank out ships and subs in video game numbers. The US also benefited in areas like the Solomons where the native population was generally more pro-Allies and thus would help with pilots getting back where as when they found a Japanese pilot they would kill him.

Once again you're missing the plot.

Myself and others have said numerous times it was going to be a lost cause and going to fall no matter what. The US simply did not have the resources available in 1942 to kick the Japanese out once they landed.

The point has been that MacArhur made it far worse than it needed to be with his blunders. He was an egomaniac, narcissist and above all a self promoter. MacArhur cared about one thing only, himself and how he could make himself look better.

What really made it worse was the Navy abandoning the Philippines. They operated out of Surabaya where they thought it was more important to maintain the link between Australia, the Dutch East Indies, and Singapore. They also kept the supplies intended for the Philippines in the Pensacola convoy for themselves.

If MacArthur hadn't been recalled Grunert would have remained in charge. MacArthur's plan of defense was essentially the same as Grunert's. The complaint with Grunert is that he planned to use the Philippine Army but did not include them in planning. Wainwright could have been promoted as well. He hated the Orange plans and said you have to attack the enemy on the beaches. So with two other alternatives who had the same plan as MacArthur I don't think you can say he made things worse.

MacArthur cared about the Philippines and their independence. He was offered the command of Hawaii and the West Coast but turned it down. He also turned down being the High Commissioner to the Philippines. He resigned from the Army so that he could focus on serving Quezon. He offered to buy rifles for the Filipinos himself because of resistance from people like Ickes who opposed the build up. When he was liberating the Philippines he made sure to secure the water supply and power plants for the people. He put Filipinos in charge of areas once they were liberated. Later when occupying Japan one of his first concerns was feeding the Japanese. These aren't actions of someone who only cares about himself.

On the subject of WW2, Trump has announced that May 8th will now be Victory in World War 2 day. What does this board think of giving it that title given that Japan was still fighting?

Top 5 Blunders by the U.S in WWII

1. Defense of the Philippines, early in the battle there was a massive logistical nightmare and several supplies were destroyed or left behind due to the confusion granted, largest surrender in US Military history
2. Kasserine Pass overextended our lines did not heed advice from our allies who had been fighting the Germans for a while and we get our butts wiped,
3. Battle of Savo Island- Picking one battle from all the battles around Guadalcanal but a night action where the Japanese and Allied task forces had roughly the same amount of firepower, but confusion between American and Australian Cruisers as well as panic from the TF command resulted in the Japanese steamrolling the force Japanese suffered around 58 casualties, and light damage on two ships, Allied casualties over 1,000 KIA, 4 Heavy Cruisers sunk, 1 heavy cruiser heavily damaged and two DD's damaged.
4. The Italian Campaign I think there was horrible handling of the campaign in general, resulted in two bloody noses at Anzio and Monte De Cassino large losses of life
5. Peleliu unnecessary, as at the time US had surface and air supremacy, so the whole reason for taking over the island (to protect the flank of MacArthur's drive towards the Philippines) was largely unnecessary, also the addition of the Japanese changing tactics to more defense in depth and the rocky terrain of the island made life miserable for the 1st Marine Division, also William H. Rupertus reluctance to use the 81st Division and to try and Keep Peleliu Marine only was questionable and probably resulted in more Marines dying.

- I have mixed feelings about the Italian campaign. I think there's a very strong strategic case for taking Sicily and southern Italy, primarily because it allows greatly increased use of the sea lanes through the Med, both to move supplies to and from India, but also the movement of Lend-Lease supplies destined for the USSR via Iran. Shipping availability was a major issue throughout the war, and every day trimmed off every voyage helped. Seizing southern Italy also allowed the establishment of air bases from which bombers could hit targets that couldn't be reached from England, especially the Romanian oil fields.
Beyond those goals, it becomes largely a political-strategic issue: the Anglo-American part of the Grand Alliance needed to be doing something (besides bombing) to help take at least some heat off the Red Army. But in order to keep German divisions in Italy, you couldn't just sit there - you had to at least try to attack.

- The other tragedy of Pelelieu is the opportunity cost. Pelelieu could easily have been neutralized by air and naval attack, allowing the soldiers and Marines used there to take Iwo Jima - which was relatively undefended in the late summer of 1944 - instead. How many American lives would that have saved?

Smeghead4761 said:

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- I have mixed feelings about the Italian campaign. I think there's a very strong strategic case for taking Sicily and southern Italy, primarily because it allows greatly increased use of the sea lanes through the Med, both to move supplies to and from India, but also the movement of Lend-Lease supplies destined for the USSR via Iran. Shipping availability was a major issue throughout the war, and every day trimmed off every voyage helped. Seizing southern Italy also allowed the establishment of air bases from which bombers could hit targets that couldn't be reached from England, especially the Romanian oil fields.
Beyond those goals, it becomes largely a political-strategic issue: the Anglo-American part of the Grand Alliance needed to be doing something (besides bombing) to help take at least some heat off the Red Army. But in order to keep German divisions in Italy, you couldn't just sit there - you had to at least try to attack.

- The other tragedy of Pelelieu is the opportunity cost. Pelelieu could easily have been neutralized by air and naval attack, allowing the soldiers and Marines used there to take Iwo Jima - which was relatively undefended in the late summer of 1944 - instead. How many American lives would that have saved?

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True but attacking in Northern Italy where it gets hilly and becomes a defenders paradise is what caused the high casualty mark in my opinion, hind sight is 20/20 for sure and I will say Operation Husky was a smashing success but seeing how things went down in Anzio and Monte De Cassino with the high casualty rates makes me think that bypassing or just holding them in place and let them wither on the vine would of been better but, as you pointed out that would of freed them up to go east and with control of Italian ports it would of threatened our trade with the Soviets which was their logistical life line.

Peleliu was MacArthur's call from what I've understood is that Nimitz really wanted to drive towards Formosa to help alleviate Chang Kai Sheik. Where as MacArthur wanted the Philippines, and Peleliu was to secure his flank. That is a good point on Iwo, since Kurbiyashi took command in June of 44, and made defense in depth their strength but an attack in the fall of 44 Would not of given enough time for his planned defenses and the focused bombing attack would of begun in July or August of 44. I still wonder if the Formosa plan had gone into effect what changes it would of brought, my guess is the Japanese still would of gone ahead with the Ichigo offensive to knock China out, but maybe that would of caused enough pause to sideline the offensive.

Propane & Accessories said:

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Smeghead4761 said:

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- I have mixed feelings about the Italian campaign. I think there's a very strong strategic case for taking Sicily and southern Italy, primarily because it allows greatly increased use of the sea lanes through the Med, both to move supplies to and from India, but also the movement of Lend-Lease supplies destined for the USSR via Iran. Shipping availability was a major issue throughout the war, and every day trimmed off every voyage helped. Seizing southern Italy also allowed the establishment of air bases from which bombers could hit targets that couldn't be reached from England, especially the Romanian oil fields.
Beyond those goals, it becomes largely a political-strategic issue: the Anglo-American part of the Grand Alliance needed to be doing something (besides bombing) to help take at least some heat off the Red Army. But in order to keep German divisions in Italy, you couldn't just sit there - you had to at least try to attack.

- The other tragedy of Pelelieu is the opportunity cost. Pelelieu could easily have been neutralized by air and naval attack, allowing the soldiers and Marines used there to take Iwo Jima - which was relatively undefended in the late summer of 1944 - instead. How many American lives would that have saved?

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True but attacking in Northern Italy where it gets hilly and becomes a defenders paradise is what caused the high casualty mark in my opinion, hind sight is 20/20 for sure and I will say Operation Husky was a smashing success but seeing how things went down in Anzio and Monte De Cassino with the high casualty rates makes me think that bypassing or just holding them in place and let them wither on the vine would of been better but, as you pointed out that would of freed them up to go east and with control of Italian ports it would of threatened our trade with the Soviets which was their logistical life line.

Peleliu was MacArthur's call from what I've understood is that Nimitz really wanted to drive towards Formosa to help alleviate Chang Kai Sheik. Where as MacArthur wanted the Philippines, and Peleliu was to secure his flank. That is a good point on Iwo, since Kurbiyashi took command in June of 44, and made defense in depth their strength but an attack in the fall of 44 Would not of given enough time for his planned defenses and the focused bombing attack would of begun in July or August of 44. I still wonder if the Formosa plan had gone into effect what changes it would of brought, my guess is the Japanese still would of gone ahead with the Ichigo offensive to knock China out, but maybe that would of caused enough pause to sideline the offensive.

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The Italian campaign after September or October of 1943 (when the Germans established the Gustav Line south of Rome) was partly the result of the political-strategic need to occupy as many German units as possible to try to help out the Russians, and partly the result of Churchill's fixation on a Mediterranean strategy. (Mark Clark's enormous ego probably played a role as well.) In order to keep German forces in Italy, the British-American forces had to at least maintain a credible threat of being able to break through, and simply sitting in place and bombarding the Gustav Line wouldn't achieve that. So they had to mount at least some attacks. (I do wonder if 15th AF could have done something like the Transportation Plan that the 8th AF did in France, except with the objective of crippling movement of German forces out of Italy, instead of keeping reinforcements from getting in, as in Normandy.)

Anzio also disrupted part of the plan for the invasion of France. If the plan had worked as hoped, it would have unhinged the Gustav Line, and the disruption to Eisenhower's invasion plans wouldn't have been as severe, but when there was no break out, and troops had to be resupplied over the beach, that required landing craft that were supposed to have been used for landings in southern France, which the original plan had going in almost simultaneously with the Normandy landings. (See Neptune by Craig Symonds for more on this.)

So, yeah, the Italian campaign after the fall of 1943 was costly in more ways than one.

As for Pelelieu, I can at least understand MacArthur's concern, but Rabaul should have taught him that such positions can be neutralized and bypassed. While Pelelieu wasn't within range of land-based bombers, the Navy could have executed drive-bys every time a carrier (even escort carriers) sailed within range. Use the place as a bombing range to keep it from becoming a threat.

I think the Italian campaign made good strategic sense at the time. After the fall of Sicily, we had this massive army which for the most part was not going to be used in d day invasion. We needed to do something with those allied armies, not just chill in Sicily. We were getting pressure from Stalin to do something to take some pressure off the soviets. By invading Italy proper, we forced the nazis to divert men and material away from the eastern front. We knocked Italy out of the war, forcing the nazis to do their best to "occupy" Italy. We attrited the hell out of the nazi army. It is also documented the Nazis diverted men from France and the Atlantic wall to prop up the efforts in Italy.

Every nazi we fought and killed in Italy was one less in Normandy or the eastern front we had to face.

lb sand said:

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I think the Italian campaign made good strategic sense at the time. After the fall of Sicily, we had this massive army which for the most part was not going to be used in d day invasion. We needed to do something with those allied armies, not just chill in Sicily. We were getting pressure from Stalin to do something to take some pressure off the soviets. By invading Italy proper, we forced the nazis to divert men and material away from the eastern front. We knocked Italy out of the war, forcing the nazis to do their best to "occupy" Italy. We attrited the hell out of the nazi army. It is also documented the Nazis diverted men from France and the Atlantic wall to prop up the efforts in Italy.

Every nazi we fought and killed in Italy was one less in Normandy or the eastern front we had to face.

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Could we have gone into southern France instead?

Quote:

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Could we have gone into southern France instead?

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On August 15, 1944, Allied troops stormed ashore in southern France against light and disorganized German resistance, opening a new front in the liberation of continental Europe. Originally designated Operation Anvil and intended to support the hammer blow of the Normandy landings two months earlier, the renamed Operation Dragoon fulfilled an American desire for a lodgment in southern France that shifted forces from the strategic cul-de-sac of Italy.

British Prime Minister Winston Churchill, who had long favored an advance up the Italian Peninsula and through the Ljubljana Gap into the Danube River basin of central Europe, strongly opposed the operation and allegedly insisted on the name change to highlight his being "dragooned" into supporting it.

But the landing and subsequent advance up the Rhne valley to link up with troops breaking out from the Normandy beachhead proved to be one of the most significant, and underrated, strategic campaigns of the entire war.

I guess I should have been more clear: could we have gone into southern France earlier rather than Italy and accomplished the same as we did in Italy?

I'm not even a qualified armchair general. But I would say no to going straight from Sicily to southern France. Our entire right flank would have been vulnerable to luftwaffe air attack. The Nazis were ready to introduced the first guided anti ship bombs which they used on our Italy invasion. They would have wreaked havoc on our invasion force. Plus, they were way stronger in fall of 1943 than august 1944.

lb sand said:

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I'm not even a qualified armchair general. But I would say no to going straight from Sicily to southern France. Our entire right flank would have been vulnerable to luftwaffe air attack. The Nazis were ready to introduced the first guided anti ship bombs which they used on our Italy invasion. They would have wreaked havoc on our invasion force. Plus, they were way stronger in fall of 1943 than august 1944.

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Can you explain more since I'm truly uninformed.

Wouldn't all of those "no" reasons you describe apply to our invasion of Italy, as well? Wouldn't all factors have been the same except no mountains in southern France and no Germans ready to repel us?

The Allies to the best of my recollection only made one set of landings in the ETO/MTO out of range of friendly, land based fighter air cover - the TORCH landings, where the only opposition was Vichy French.

It was done several times in the Pacific - Guadalcanal, Hollandia, Pelelieu, and Leyte that that I'm sure of, and I'm only slightly less sure about Tarawa, the Marshalls, and the Marianas. But Pacitic operations, other than Guadalcanal, had the ability to bring in carrier air support that could overwhelm the local Japanese air.

KIKIAggies859 said:

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On the subject of WW2, Trump has announced that May 8th will now be Victory in World War 2 day. What does this board think of giving it that title given that Japan was still fighting?

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I think its a bad move. Honestly who knows if Trump even knows what years WW2 was fought. My best guess is he saw the big parades that Russia puts on every year and thought we needed to celebrate at the same time. Really it seems disrespectful to the many who were still fighting in the Pacific, especially since it was Japan that brought the US into the war to begin with.

Smeghead4761 said:

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The Allies to the best of my recollection only made one set of landings in the ETO/MTO out of range of friendly, land based fighter air cover - the TORCH landings, where the only opposition was Vichy French.

It was done several times in the Pacific - Guadalcanal, Hollandia, Pelelieu, and Leyte that that I'm sure of, and I'm only slightly less sure about Tarawa, the Marshalls, and the Marianas. But Pacitic operations, other than Guadalcanal, had the ability to bring in carrier air support that could overwhelm the local Japanese air.

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I can't think of any either. I think people often downplay the risk and complexity of landings. Plus people forget the limited number of landing craft available. Clark had to make the Anzio landings in January because the landing craft were being pulled and sent for Overlord after that. They got a couple of extensions just to keep them that long.

There is a reason the Germans never made a contested landing by sea. They took Crete with paratroopers and even then that should never have happened. They took Norway but for all practical purposes that was by surprise and mostly unopposed (outside of the Blucher).