I can't recommend enough the "guns of august" book as so many of those linked chain of events could have been broken.

July 1914 by Sean McMeekin is a very thorough examination of the political and diplomatic maneuverings and blunderings that went on between the assassination of Franz Ferdinand and the start of the shooting. It's amazing what a clusterf*** that whole thing was.

I'm pretty sure I posted a similar "what if" in this thread a while back: what if the Germans had stood on the strategic defensive in the West against France, and instead turned their primary focus on the Russians?

The results of the Battle of the Frontiers - where the French army was bloodily repulsed attempting to attack into Alsace-Lorraine while the German right wing marched through Belgium - show that the Germans could hold off the French with only a small portion of their army. And the Battle of Tannenberg show what the Germans could do to the Russians with another secondary effort. So how badly could the Germans have thrashed the Russians if they had made that their main effort in 1914?

Meanwhile engaging in focused diplomatic efforts pointing out that Germany is only fighting Russia because Russia attacked Austria-Hungary, with whom Germany had a defense treaty. Russia had no treaty obligation to defend Serbia, which means Russia was the aggressor.* The focus of this being to keep England out of the war entirely, and hopefully convince France that it's not worth the cost of bashing their heads against the German defenses.

*It's worth noting that Russia made no move to help Serbia when Serbia got involved in a war with Turkey a few years prior. Russia mainly saw the spat between Austria-Hungary and Serbia as an opportunity to grab the Austro-Hungarian province of Galicia.

What if Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife had survived the assassination attempt in Sarajevo?

More of a broad stroke, but always wondered what the European Theater would look like if the US took a "Pacific first" instead of "Europe first" approach to the war, since it was Japan that actually attacked us.

Ghost of Andrew Eaton said:

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What if Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife had survived the assassination attempt in Sarajevo?

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Germany was going to war one way or another.

Even more Russians would have died

The Pacific was initially only receiving 15% of the supplies for the war effort. While both the Army and Navy agreed that Germany must be defeated first Admiral King argued for increasing resources for the Pacific to 25-30% when talking with the British. General Marshall also echoed this with increasing it to 30%. But with the low allocation we had to take a defensive position in the Pacific. The Army agreed to Europe first with the understanding that we would attack Germany soon. General Marshall wanted to build up forces for the invasion of Germany at the earliest possible moment. But this did not happen as the British kept delaying it. If we had doubled the resources to 30% or at least to 50% you most certainly speed up the war in the Pacific and may still be able to invade Europe in 1944. If the invasion is delayed another year maybe we use the bomb on Germany instead.

After the Romans lost 60,000 in a day at the battle of Cannae, it was a mess and Hannibal marched up and down Italy looking for a way to finish them off in battle in the 2nd Punic war. What if…he had succeeded, before being recalled to Carthage, and actually took Rome?



He lacked the logistics most would agree to pull off such a siege but it's still an interesting question.

I suppose this is mentioned up thread but what if the Germans hadn't blown it at Stalingrad?



Of course, not necessarily a pleasant scenario, thank goodness Paulus was…who he was.

It probably depends on what is meant by the Germans 'winning' at Stalingrad. Taking the city, probably on the march, without that long, grinding battle? Or the failure of Operation Uranus, and 6th Army not being trapped in the city?

In any case, Army Group A is still highly unlikely to make it across the Caucasus mountains to take Baku and the oil fields there, which was the real objective of the German summer 1942 offensive. That means they would still be badly overextended and vulnerable to a Red Army counteroffensive.

So, the Red Army's winter 42/43 offensive probably would have retaken much less territory, but it would just be a delay in Germany's eventual defeat. Possibly even enough that the Western Allies take Berlin.

I think the Battle of France still goes much the same as it does in actual history. Germany may have more troops available for the Ardennes offensive, but they'd still be in trouble with fuel and transport, with Operation Point Blank having ground the Luftwaffe into near impotence and Germany's fuel production and internal transport system being pounded by British and American bombers.

One of the things that I think is underappreciated about the Anglo-American bomber offensive is the amount of resources Germany devoted to trying to stop it. By the spring of 1943, roughly 70 percent of the Luftwaffe's strength was facing west, with most of that devoted to stopping the bombers. Then there's this, from Richard Overy's Why the Allies Won :

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By 1944 one-third of all German artillery production consisted of anti-aircraft guns; the anti-aircraft effort absorbed 20 percent of all ammunition produced, one-third of the output of the optical industry, and between half and two-thirds of the production of radar and signals equipment. . . by 1944, an estimated two million Germans were engaged in anti-aircraft defense. (pg 131)

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In the first five months of 1944, roughly 2300 of the approximately 2500 fighter pilots that the Luftwaffe had available in January had been killed or otherwise put out of action, mostly in air battles over Germany.

One interesting possibility is that a German victory at Stalingrad, whatever it looked like, might have extended the war enough for the first A-bomb to be dropped on Berlin, not Hiroshima. Would that have made any difference in persuading Japan to surrender?

Great points, certainly can't reach any conclusions there. Hitler really was so stupid as a commander that even without Paulus' surrender he probably would have ordered some other military idiocy somehow, imho.

Long form discussion as to 'what if' WW1 could have been avoided.

What if Hannibal was able to conquer the city of Rome.

I dunno, I think the issue he was trying to press at that point was to get a direct in the field confrontation with the primary Roman army. That's why he was parading up and down the Italian peninsula. He probably could have taken Rome itself but didn't want to then get locked into a defensive siege there.

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His strategic aim was not the destruction of Rome itself, but the break- up of the confederation it had established throughout Italy by conquest. The cohesive power of Rome lay in its army. If this could be destroyed, then a general uprising might follow, but the problem Hannibal faced was, how to achieve this when the Romans were so much stronger?

In developing his operational plan, Hannibal rejected the time-honoured custom of besieging cities as this would allow the Romans to concentrate against him, while should the cities fall they would have to be defended, leading to a wide dispersion of his force and so its piecemeal destruction. Instead he adopted a manoeuvre-based concept whereby he would fight the Roman army at a time and place of his own choosing.

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Ultimately, of course, his mission/plan failed to stoke an uprising, and as well to destroy the Roman Army, so I do respect there are folks even today who see the strategy as a mistake.

Sort of a war what-if...what-if the Marshall Plan had extended to the Soviet Union? Who it have warmed things between the two governments at all?

Ghost of Andrew Eaton said:

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Sort of a war what-if...what-if the Marshall Plan had extended to the Soviet Union? Who it have warmed things between the two governments at all?

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Marshall Plan aid was offered to the USSR and the other countries occupied by the Red Army after the war. The Soviets rejected it and forced their client states to do likewise.

Smeghead4761 said:

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Ghost of Andrew Eaton said:

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Sort of a war what-if...what-if the Marshall Plan had extended to the Soviet Union? Who it have warmed things between the two governments at all?

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Marshall Plan aid was offered to the USSR and the other countries occupied by the Red Army after the war. The Soviets rejected it and forced their client states to do likewise.

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Extended was the wrong choice of words. What if they had accepted it?

They stridently rejected it though, it wasn't really a consideration of theirs. They'd been attacked 3 times in the past 30 or so years and really didn't want to see a rebuilt Germany, or further threats. There was basically no chance they'd have cooperated. The Soviet-Russian mindset was driven by a fear at least going back to the Crimean war (if not Napoleonic) of invasion by 'the west.' Some of this persists even through to today in their attitude toward Nato expansion and Ukraine etc.

I will play, they would have taken the money and used it to speed up progress on their weapons programs. They would increased their nuclear options exploding the hydrogen bomb sooner, would have built up east germany's military establishments, and possibly invaded west germany in the 60's.

I think the conditions attached to the aid (which is why they rejected it in the first place) would have significantly weakened their grip on Eastern Europe, if it didn't pull those countries away entirely.

If they had actually used the aid wisely (a huge if, given a) Stalin, and b) Marxism-Leninism in general), it probably would have helped their economy recover quicker than it did.

I took a class recently on the Eastern Front, which included some bit on after the war, and the consensus seemed to be that the Soviet economy had not fully recovered from the war before the USSR collapsed in 1991. A lot of the blame deservedly can be placed on the fact that communist economics just don't work, along with the burden of funding the USSR's huge military establishment.

But also keep in mind that the American South, according to some economic historians, didn't recover from the Civil War until the early 1920s.

But overall, I think accepting the aid, given the attached conditions, would have done serious damage to their political system, which is why they rejected it.

I agree with your take but it's a very difficult what-if because it's almost impossible for the USSR to accept the funding.

No disrespect meant but I got you covered back on Page 1.

What if Saddam never invades Kuwait on August 2, 1990?

In that alternative universe, your friend is still alive, along with other follow on actions.

In that world, my Army ROTC classmate LTC Roy Tisdale '92 doesn't get murdered by one of his own troops and his picture isn't posted on the wall in the Dixie Chicken for me to say Howdy! to every time I go there.

What if…WW1 ended with the Xmas truce? Moltke wanted to send the 1st and 2nd armies north of Paris. When that got pushed back Falkenhayn replaced him but the question is whether in late 1914 if a stalemate had been reached and the war ended…what might have been?



The period between Sept 1914 and Jan 1915 seems to me to be of outsized impact as to the eventual decline and fall of western civilization.

Smeghead4761 said:

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It probably depends on what is meant by the Germans 'winning' at Stalingrad. Taking the city, probably on the march, without that long, grinding battle? Or the failure of Operation Uranus, and 6th Army not being trapped in the city?

In any case, Army Group A is still highly unlikely to make it across the Caucasus mountains to take Baku and the oil fields there, which was the real objective of the German summer 1942 offensive. That means they would still be badly overextended and vulnerable to a Red Army counteroffensive.

So, the Red Army's winter 42/43 offensive probably would have retaken much less territory, but it would just be a delay in Germany's eventual defeat. Possibly even enough that the Western Allies take Berlin.

I think the Battle of France still goes much the same as it does in actual history. Germany may have more troops available for the Ardennes offensive, but they'd still be in trouble with fuel and transport, with Operation Point Blank having ground the Luftwaffe into near impotence and Germany's fuel production and internal transport system being pounded by British and American bombers.

One of the things that I think is underappreciated about the Anglo-American bomber offensive is the amount of resources Germany devoted to trying to stop it. By the spring of 1943, roughly 70 percent of the Luftwaffe's strength was facing west, with most of that devoted to stopping the bombers. Then there's this, from Richard Overy's Why the Allies Won :

Quote:

---

By 1944 one-third of all German artillery production consisted of anti-aircraft guns; the anti-aircraft effort absorbed 20 percent of all ammunition produced, one-third of the output of the optical industry, and between half and two-thirds of the production of radar and signals equipment. . . by 1944, an estimated two million Germans were engaged in anti-aircraft defense. (pg 131)

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In the first five months of 1944, roughly 2300 of the approximately 2500 fighter pilots that the Luftwaffe had available in January had been killed or otherwise put out of action, mostly in air battles over Germany.

One interesting possibility is that a German victory at Stalingrad, whatever it looked like, might have extended the war enough for the first A-bomb to be dropped on Berlin, not Hiroshima. Would that have made any difference in persuading Japan to surrender?

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I've seen it summarized that the effort Germany took to stop the Allied bombers exceeded whatever actual long term damage they did in terms of making a difference in the air. It was a true "Third Front" and once I heard that and started digging even just a smidge under the surface, it's pretty obvious how true that was. They had over a million plus uniformed men just on AAA duty alone post 1943.

Small consolation to our brave air warriors going up into those skies over and over….

You made a lot of great points, and I'd just add that the impact of having the Germans respond to the campaigns with so much materiel to shoot down/make the bomber tactics shift is really the only 'win' from the massive 8th Air Force losses/effort.

Both sides spent a fortune in materiel (the Norden Bombsight is one of my favorite tales from the era, especially as Norden himself was such a committed Christian he declined to have invented it even, and that a German working for him sent the Nazi's the blueprints for it a couple years before the war) and manpower yet the impact on German industrial output was not at all what was hoped for. The other benefit was that the Luftwaffe expended so many fighters going after the bombers (and later escort fighters) they had literally nothing for air cover at Normandy. But in reality until late 1944 only around 10 percent of bombs dropped by Bomber Command/8th AF probably hit their targets, or came close, and the Germans probably took down 10 bombers for every fighter of their own shot down by an 'impregnable' bomber. Yet, overall I think again your points are correct because the German reaction to the campaigns cost them many other options for the crews/people/weapons deployed against the bombers.

Anyway, I came here to post this historical fantasy question as to the Xmas truce:

Of course, officers on both sides were appalled at the Xmas truce primarily as dehumanization of the enemy was critical to discipline etc. More:

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I find remarkably deep meaning in the events of the Christmas Truce for no other reason than that among so much destruction, no amount of hatred or bitterness could overcome their common humanity. This fact has compelled me to share this story with my airmen, and more recently, my midshipmen, every December. Among the roughly 2,000 servicemembers I have worked with in my career so far, there is a lasting impact for those who had the patience to read or listen. Each time, I recount the details of the truce and the horrors of the Western Front, I try to share the following lesson: Duty and humanity are virtues that bind all in the profession of arms, but they exist in tension with each other and must be precariously balanced.

The soldiers of World War I spent one day celebrating their common humanity and another 1,567 destroying it. The war would go on to claim the lives of an additional seven million soldiers. It was a brief and unrepeatable instance. No person in the trenches of 1914 had the authority to end the war, and their discipline as well as honor demanded that they return to fighting. Anything else would be mutiny or desertion. Wars are fought between nations, and soldiers are but tools of those political disagreements. Nor should the lessons of the Christmas Truce be taken strictly along religious lines. In 1968, U.S. forces decided to respect the North Vietnamese call for a seven-day ceasefire for the Vietnamese celebration of the Lunar New Year, and three days later the Tet Truce turned into the Tet Offensive. In 1973, Israel was attacked by an Egyptian-led coalition on Yom Kippur, which also fell within the holy month of Ramadan.

The most important lesson of the Christmas Truce has nothing to do with religion, holidays, or peace. I am not advocating that we do not seek to kill the enemy or destroy their capacity for war. Quite the opposite, actually. The image of those soldiers shaking hands in No-Man's Land is meant only to remind us that the enemy is human. There is an inextricable bond of commonality, even between soldiers who fight against each other. Whether watching enemies in a neighboring trench or following them from thousands of miles away through the lens of an unmanned aircraft, it is incumbent on all members of the profession of arms to recognize the burden that comes with taking lives. We use terms like "military-aged male" because it makes the strike decision easier. We are not reminded that the target is a son, brother, or father with his own list of life goals and desires. The Christmas Truce should remind every service member of the incredible gravity of our role.

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Hitler himself (just a runner at that point in history), and generals of both sides wanted it to never happen again:

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In the days following Christmas, violence returned to the Western Front, although the truce persisted until after New Year's Day in some areas. While the truce could not have succeeded without the endorsement of junior officers on both sides, British and German generals quickly took steps to prevent any further episodes of fraternization between their men. Still, there were no courts-martial or punishments linked to the events of the Christmas Truce; senior commanders likely recognized the disastrous effect that such a move would have on morale in the trenches. Attempts to revive the truce on Christmas Day 1915 were quashed, and there were no subsequent widespread cease-fires on the Western Front until the armistice of November 1918.

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dcbowers said:

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What if Sam Houston and the Texians had gotten decimated by Santa Anna at San Jacinto?

We'd all be speaking Spanish, for one.

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Well most of us likely wouldn't be here at all because our ancestors wouldn't have come to Mexico.

I'm only here because Rice University was free if you got in. That brought my smart, middle class Dad to Houston 60 years ago. So if Texas was still Mexican, there'd be no Rice University and my parents would not have come here.

What if the British Army had awarded George Washington the regular army commission, he so desperately wanted. The world might be a very different place today.

Good question. I think in reality if his father hadn't died when he was 11, and then his older brother's in laws (the Fairfax's) hadn't gotten him the choice assignments/basically made him a major in the colonial Army he might have chosen a much different path.

Part of a good discussion of the topic:

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George was the fourth of nine children. His father was well off, and young George expected to inherit considerable wealth and status. Then when George was 11, his father died. This set the family back somewhat. George's two older brothers had both gone to England for school, but after the father died, the family could not afford to send George. As a teenager, George realized that with the family living off of their father's dwindling estate, after it was divided between all of George's siblings there would be very little left. George began to think of the military as a way to maintain the status and lifestyle that he was used to. When he was about 14 he almost joined the navy, but his mother prevailed on him to stay at home. George taught himself surveying, in part because he thought it was a skill he thought he could parlay into an army career. However, George got lucky and his career unfolded in ways he had not anticipated. His older brother, Lawrence, married into the wealthy and influential Fairfax family. They got George appointed surveyor of Culpeper County which gave George the opportunity to acquire thousands of acres of land in the Shenandoah Valley. At the tender age of 21 the Fairfaxes got George appointed major in the colonial militia. When war broke out in 1754, George was perfectly positioned. Within a few years he was a colonial colonel. Also during the middle 1750s, his two older brothers died, consolidating the family wealth once more. This is how George became the wealthy owner of Mount Vernon.

So George lost interest in an army career for a couple of different reasons: 1) he had already gained considerable rank and fame so that he was unwilling to start over again as a junior officer, and 2) he had become a wealthy gentleman and no longer needed the army to establish his status and get ahead.

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