871698 This post is written with the deepest respect for the victims and their loved ones. My hope is for justice to be served and for tragedies like this to never happen again.
In light of recent, tragic event at DCA, and as someone who loves both aviation and data, I wanted to take an
objective look at confidential aviation safety reports from the
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) regarding DCA. These reports, submitted by pilots, controllers, and other aviation professionals, highlight recurring near-miss incidents, helicopter conflicts, and concerns about air traffic control practices at DCA.
Was this a disaster in the making? You be the judge. Reading through these reports is both eye-opening and unsettling.
I drafted a table summarising the findings and you can find it below.
Aviation safety relies on learning from past incidents, not just reporting them into the void. The ASRS reports make it clear that the risks at DCAnear-misses, helicopter conflicts, and ATC pressurewere well-documented by those on the front lines.
Yet, instead of serving as warnings, they remained just that: reports. The tragedy has already happened, but the voices of those who raised concerns should not be ignored. The question now is whether meaningful changes will be made to prevent history from repeating itself.
You can make your search
here. I used:
These are some quotes I find eerie to read:
Quote:
"I am a Captain for a major carrier, and have flown in and out of DCA with that carrier for many years, much of the time being based there. I currently fly all over the US. [...]
I understand DCA is a busy airport, I was based there for years. The military low level helicopter traffic that routinely is in the DCA traffic area complicates matters. But this is probably the most dangerous airport in the United States, strictly based on the the fact the controllers are pushing, pushing, pushing, in an attempt to handle the traffic they have."
Quote:
"I do remember seeing a target to the east on TCAS, but it is commonplace to have helicopter traffic around 300-500 AGL in that area. [...] I would say this only reinforces the fact that flight crews need to be extra vigilant conducting flight operations in high traffic areas and special use airports such as Washington National. And also to never completely rely on ATC to maintain aircraft separation."
Quote:
"We were cleared to circle to and land on runway 33. ATC also added that there was a low level helicopter and that the helicopter had us in sight. At the Wilson bridge we turned to the northeast to set ourselves up for a landing on runway 33. We continued normally and started our turn to final when I saw an opposite direction helicopter very close to our altitude, but slightly below us and climbing. I was about to initiate the go around regardless of the TCAS when we got the RA. As we started the go around I saw the helicopter make an aggressive descent. We were given a turn to the east and a climb to 2,000 feet which we complied with. After that, we cleaned up the plane, setup for another approach, and landed on runway 1 without incident. Once we cleared the runway, ground control asked me if I wanted to call the DCA tower supervisor for an explanation of what happened. I gladly accepted. The tower supervisor I spoke with told me a few things that explained what may have happened. Number one, he said that the helicopters operating in that area should NEVER be above 200 feet. According to him, the helicopter was at 800 feet, clearly not where he was supposed to be. He also explained that ATC may have taken their eyes off the helicopter for a second because they would never expect those helicopters to do something that egregious. That seems plausible given the fact that I've never seen a helicopter in that area at that altitude. He suggested that it was most probably a deviation on the part of the Pilot of the helicopter, and a loss of aircraft separation that was also the fault of the helicopter pilot.
Quote:
Helicopter pilots in and around DCA should adhere to ATC instructions"
Quote:
"While we were flying the river visual to Runway 19 into DCA we received a TCAS alert. We were around SETOC or just past it and fully configured to land. There was, what I could only guess as I never saw it, a helicopter about 300ft below us. The TCAS showed it climbing but at a very very slow rate as it never showed closer than 300ft to us. When we flew over top of it, we got a "monitor vertical speed alert from TCAS which we then pitched into the green arc on the VSI which was -300fpm or greater. After we received the "clear of conflict" the FO corrected and got back on glide path. I assessed that we were still within stable approach criteria and we continued the approach and landed in DCA without further issue. We never received a warning of the traffic from ATC so we were unaware it was there. Suggestion: Need to have better separation for DCA traffic on the river visual to the helicopter traffic that is flying up and down the river. Maybe by timing the separation of when we began the approach to where that traffic will be when we cross overhead."
ACN (ID)
Date
Synopsis
2106384202404
Air carrier Captain reported a NMAC with a helicopter while on visual approach. Flight crew responded to the TCAS alert and continued the approach.
1947048202210
Air Carrier Captain reported on final approach at DCA, a near miss with a helicopter, which was lifting off from a nearby hospital. The proximity of the helicopter resulted in a RA and missed approach.
1558721201807
DCA Controller reported they failed to issue traffic information to multiple VFR flights on approach.
1450496201705
Air carrier flight crew reported on a night River Visual Runway 19 to DCA they received a GPWS obstacle warning and continued to a landing.
1449645201705
PCT TRACON and DCA Tower Controller reported an unsafe situation involving VIP movements.
1344833 201604
Helicopter crew was unable to establish communication with the PCT TRACON for permission to enter the DC SFRA. The aircraft proceeded to its destination anyway.
1283693 201507
A CRJ-200 flight crew reported a NMAC with a helicopter on approach to Runway 33 at DCA. The crew stated the traffic call from Tower came too late to be effective.
1266769201505
Pilot reports of DCA controllers "climbing into my cockpit" and how they are telling the pilots various things that he feels they shouldn't be doing.
1258213 201504
A320 Captain reported experiencing an NMAC with a helicopter on the Mount Vernon Approach to DCA.
1249654201503
ERJ-175 Captain reported an airborne conflict with a helicopter on approach to DCA.
1127815 201311
Tower Controller described a conflict event involving a helicopter operating a photo mission and an Air Carrier arrival, the reporter suggesting improved and standardized procedures for handling helicopter photo operations.
1095485 201306
A320 Captain experiences an airborne conflict with a military helicopter at 900 FT during a River Visual to Runway 19 at DCA. TCAS RA states to monitor vertical speed with the helicopter 200 FT below the A320.
1090002 201305
When cleared off the Mount Vernon visual to circle to land on Runway 33 the flight crew of a commercial fixed wing aircraft suffered a NMAC with helicopter that had been directed to make a right 360 to clear the approach path.
935390 201103
DCA Controller reported a TCAS RA event experienced by a River Visual arrival during operations utilizing combined Local and Helicopter positions, suggesting the an increase in the use of the Helicopter position.
933511201102
DCA Controller described a TCAS RA event involving an arrival to Runway 19 and a helicopter landing at Georgetown Hospital, the helicopter climbing unexpectedly after granting a frequency change.
880002 201003
An E-170 flight crew on the River Visual to DCA experienced a close encounter on short final with an aircraft inbound to the same runway apparently on a left visual approach for the same runway. Neither approach control nor the tower advised of the conflicting traffic. --> "I do remember seeing a target to the east on TCAS, but it is commonplace to have helicopter traffic around 300-500 AGL in that area. [...] I would say this only reinforces the fact that flight crews need to be extra vigilant conducting flight operations in high traffic areas and special use airports such as Washington National. And also to never completely rely on ATC to maintain aircraft separation."
Adding extra reports I found below:
1318660 201511
PCT Controller reported of a problem that happened 17 days prior. The question was, what type of separation was being used. Tower controller reported visual separation after being asked. Reporter thought this was a cover up for the lack of a timely investigation.
1871698 202201
Air carrier Captain reported receiving a terrain caution message followed by a low altitude alert from ATC while responding to a traffic resolution advisory. (Helicopter traffic was heading up the Potomac while we were on the river visual approach did not alert us to the on coming traffic. )
Full text for almost all the IDs:
1. ACN: 2106384Date : 202404
While we were flying the river visual to Runway 19 into DCA we received a TCAS alert. We were around SETOC or just past it and fully configured to land. There was, what I could only guess as I never saw it, a helicopter about 300ft below us. The TCAS showed it climbing but at a very very slow rate as it never showed closer than 300ft to us. When we flew over top of it, we got a "monitor vertical speed alert from TCAS which we then pitched into the green arc on the VSI which was -300fpm or greater. After we received the "clear of conflict" the FO corrected and got back on glide path. I assessed that we were still within stable approach criteria and we continued the approach and landed in DCA without further issue. We never received a warning of the traffic from ATC so we were unaware it was there. Suggestion: Need to have better separation for DCA traffic on the river visual to the helicopter traffic that is flying up and down the river. Maybe by timing the separation of when we began the approach to where that traffic will be when we cross overhead.
SynopsisAir carrier Captain reported a NMAC with a helicopter while on visual approach. Flight crew responded to the TCAS alert and continued the approach.
2. ACN: 1947048Date : 202210
On RNP 19 approach, on the approach path just past waypoint FONVI at about 1100 ft. MSL, we got a TCAS TA. A yellow traffic icon showing 500 ft. below us was just ahead and to the left. As our airplane continued descending on the approach, I, the Captain, looked out my window and did not see anything. We immediately got an RA telling us to "CLIMB", at which point we were about 950 ft. MSL. It then called out "CLIMB NOW" as I was turning off the autopilot and auto throttles and pitching up. We followed our proper procedures, and told DCA Tower that we had an RA we were responding to. ATC then asked if we were still going to land. At this point we were getting uncomfortably close to the prohibited area P56A, so I started turning right absent any instructions from ATC. The First Officer told ATC we were not landing, so Tower eventually gave us a heading and an altitude, which we followed once the TCAS RA had cleared. We then rejoined the approach back at the beginning, speaking to Approach Control, and landed on Runway 19 without further incident. Upon review of the approach path and other information, we estimate we came within 300 ft. or less of what turned out to be a helicopter lifting off of the hospital.
SynopsisAir Carrier Captain reported on final approach at DCA, a near miss with a helicopter, which was lifting off from a nearby hospital. The proximity of the helicopter resulted in a RA and missed approach.
3. ACN: 1558721Date : 201807
I was working the Local and Helicopter positions combined at DCA ATC. I have been CPC/FPL for [a short time].
I accepted a handoff from Potomac TRACON on Aircraft X 2 miles west of ZZZ. Aircraft X contacted DCA Tower and requested to fly Route 1-Route 4 -ZZZ1 and then to ZZZ2. I radar contacted Aircraft X, approved the request and issued the altimeter.
Aircraft Y called on a seven mile final to DCA and requested to land on Runway XX. I then I cleared Aircraft Y to land.
Note. My standard practice for helicopters flying the DCA helicopter route is to issue any pertinent landing traffic by the time the helicopters pass over the South Capitol Street Bridge.
Aircraft X asked if I had issued traffic on the aircraft landing Runway XX. I thought I had applied my standard practice of issuing traffic to the helicopters over the bridge so I informed Aircraft X that I had issued the traffic.
Once Aircraft Y landed, he asked about the flight of three helicopters off his right. I informed him I had issued traffic to Aircraft X.
Neither aircraft declared a near miss on frequency. At all times I had maintained Tower applied visual separation between Aircraft X and Aircraft Y.
I recommend recurrent helicopter training for the facility to prevent this incident from occurring in the future with other controllers.
Synopsis
DCA Controller reported they failed to issue traffic information to multiple VFR flights on approach.
4. ACN: 1450496Date : 201705
Narrative: 1
During the DCA River Visual Runway 19 approach (night VMC), a few actions happened in quick succession. The first happened when we were reconfiguring the airplane for the approach. I called for flaps 3, after a few seconds, I looked over and saw the flap selector in the flaps 4 configuration. I mentioned this to the FO who reconfigured the flap selector back to flaps 3. At the time, I was hand flying the airplane. Whilst my attention was on the flap configuration, I unintentionally must have lowered the nose of the airplane causing the GPWS to call out "Pull Up, Pull Up, Obstacle" to annunciate. I quickly added power and raised the nose of the airplane to arrest the GPWS.
Don't fixate on any one thing. Keep a good awareness of what is happening around you.
Narrative: 2
I was pilot monitoring for this leg and we were performing the River Visual 19 into DCA in night VMC conditions. Prior to being cleared for the approach, we were being vectored by ATC. We were instructed to slow to 170 kts and descend to and maintain 3000 ft. We were further instructed to slow to 150 kts, maintain 3000 ft and advise when we had the river in sight. I repeated the instruction with no correction from ATC. We slowed to 150 kts, and at this point we were at 3000 ft just northwest of FERGI. ATC asked if we had started our turn south yet and I advised we had the river in sight. He then asked if we turned south yet and "I said no, what was the heading." He said 150 degrees and advise when we have the river. We complied, turned to 150 degrees, advised we had the river insight and ATC subsequently cleared us for the approach. The controller then said to maintain 170 kts until 5 DME. During this, the captain had called for flaps 3 and I missed the detent and went to flaps 4 by mistake. In the confusion, I didn't notice but the captain caught it. I went back to flaps 3 and we continued on with the approach. ATC told us to switch to tower. Tower told us we were cleared to land. We continued descending on the approach and finished configuring. Our descent rate was roughly 600-700 fpm. Further in on the approach, tower advised us there was a helicopter behind and below us and after his transmission, we received a traffic alert. I was looking for the traffic outside and on the MFD and trying to maintain the airfield. Between 700-800 ft we received a GPWS caution followed by a warning. We were about 3 DME from DCA, near the cluster of hotels when we received the warning. The captain pulled up and leveled-off at an altitude more consistent with our point on the approach, the warning ceased, and we continued on with the approach. At 500 ft, we were on a proper descent path, at our approach speed and in a safe position to land. We landed and taxied to the gate.
In hindsight, as pilot monitoring, there were many factors that lead to the GPWS warning and it started before the approach. The confusion between us and the controller helped facilitate me selecting the wrong flap setting and not realizing it due to my attention being split. The traffic alert on the approach broke my attention away from monitoring the approach momentarily. These all helped me to not realize that we had gotten low on that segment of the visual approach ultimately leading to the GPWS warning for obstacles on the visual. After the captain reacted, the warning went away and we were back on the correct descent angle for the approach. The correct action would have been, as pilot monitoring, to immediately call for the go-around when we received the warning.
Synopsis
Air carrier flight crew reported on a night River Visual Runway 19 to DCA they received a GPWS obstacle warning and continued to a landing.
5. ACN: 1449645Date : 201705
Narrative: 1
Presidential movements continue to be an issue between DCA and PCT. Aircraft X was ADW inbound to [DC Area]. DCA tower called with a 3 minute to lift call off ADW which is 7 miles SE of DCA. We begin holding arrivals at that point. We were just beginning an arrival push and approach/final had 15 planes or more.
While we were holding airplanes in the sky and backing up ZDC, DCA tower continued to release airplanes compounding the issue. A lot of arrivals spinning and more departures entering the NAS is a dangerous game for DCA tower to play. DCA tower took it two steps further this movement by launching two departures with Aircraft X less than a mile and no altitude, converging.
How is it we on approach are not allowed to run arrivals yet they have the authority to release airplanes right at presidential aircraft?
Advise DCA tower the needs of the TRACON during these movements and educate them on proper coordination. Develop a Work group between DCA/PCT/ADW on VIP movements.
Narrative: 2
I was working Aircraft X from ADW to the National Observatory (NOB). On initial contact, Aircraft X advised that they would be using alternate routing. I acknowledged their transmission and advised the tower supervisor and local controller. Aircraft X proceeded via Woods Corner - to the river - route 4 - route 1 - to the NOB [National Observatory]. I was advised later on that PCT MTV [Mount Vernon Area] had concerns about the amount of time that arrivals were stopped and about departures off of DCA. Basic separation was maintained and I had Aircraft X in sight from WC all the way to their destination.
We do not question when a [VIP] aircraft changes its route. If they could provide earlier notification then initial call on frequency it would be optimal. We understand when bad weather forces a change.
Synopsis
PCT TRACON and DCA Tower Controller reported an unsafe situation involving VIP movements.
6. ACN: 1344833 Date : 201604
Narrative: 1
Upon departure and obtaining cruise flight at 1500 feet MSL/150 Knots, radio communication was attempted with TRACON prior to entry into the SFRA via the Special Flight Rules Area (SFRA) frequency with negative results. I had experienced this occurrence on numerous occasions in this portion of airspace unless able to operate at a higher altitude (1800 feet-2000 feet MSL) or closer to the Flight Restricted Zone (FRZ). This had also been a discussion topic at two Helicopter Organization conferences with TRACON representation. They stated there was a known radio communication deficiency with aircraft operating at lower altitudes in that area. Their guidance was to proceed into the SFRA and continue with radio calls "in-the-blind", while squawking the appropriate company transponder code until two-way contact was established. Coordination would also ensure the assigned mission aircraft route of flight and destination would be verified.
Since the current weather conditions (approximately 2100 foot ceiling and 4-5 miles in scattered rain showers) prevented a higher altitude, the decision was made to proceed into the SFRA and attempt further radio contact. Two more calls were made on the SFRA frequency with no response received from ATC. Five miles into the SFRA and still unable to contact ATC, I had the SIC switch to Tower frequency. As the SIC was establishing contact with tower, a law enforcement helicopter relayed a TRACON request for our aircraft to contact them on [frequency]. I responded we had already switched to tower and would proceed on that frequency. Immediate two-way communication was established with a positive radar contact call and tower clearance to enter the airspace via our requested route of flight. The flight continued, and return to the home base.
Upon our return, we received a message to contact a FAA representative to discuss aspects of our flight. The conversation covered what was occurring and the actions taken by our aircrew. The FAA representative detailed how TRACON could see ours and another aircraft's (10 minutes in trail) appropriate transponder codes, we were NORDO. The FAA representative stated with both aircraft within close proximity to each other they were thinking they were being tested and initiated their protocols. The FAA Representative stated he called and was able to verify both aircraft, their route of flight and destination. He also stated further protocols were suspended. I discussed with him the actions and thought process taken by our aircrew as previously outlined. He relayed a couple of frequencies provided by TRACON that would be more useful in that area of the SFRA. He thanked me for the feedback and I stated I would pass this information on to our Command aircrew.
What could prevent this from occurring in the future?
All of our functions require a multifaceted effort when operating with clear and effective communication between all parties vital in successful mission accomplishment. With the associated Special Use Airspace and its unique operating procedures, everyone must be diligent in this effort. From the individual Command aircraft to ATC, every level must be clear in their intent and effectively communicate this to all other concerned entities. Improved communication relays/towers in this area would be helpful in filling in gaps further assisting lower altitude aircraft. Establish an improved communication path between the helicopters and TRACON to pass frequency changes that enhance known problem areas.
Narrative: 2
Prior to entering the SFRA, aircraft with company code in the transponder contacted TRACON. TRACON directed the crew to contact them on [frequency]. The crew did not receive a response on [frequency], which is common when flying in this area at lower altitudes. While continuing into the SFRA, switched back to a different frequency. Traffic on this frequency was heavy. After a few minutes, the crew was able to gain contact with the controller and heard "radar contact" from the controller. Communication with ATC progressed normally after that to include switching to Tower.
Synopsis
Helicopter crew was unable to establish communication with the PCT TRACON for permission to enter the DC SFRA. The aircraft proceeded to its destination anyway.
7.
ACN: 1283693 201507
Narrative: 1
[Our flight] into DCA was in a NMAC. We were supposed to circle from the visual Runway 1 to instead land on 33. We followed the [company] station bulletin procedures exactly as planned and came within very close contact of another aircraft. This occurred about 400 feet off the ground to the point where the pilot monitoring had to take the controls to make a correction in order to prevent it from becoming a midair collision. After there was action taken to make a correction from the close call, we were then informed by DCA tower of close traffic although at that point it would have been too late. I have flown with people who for the purpose of having a better chance of a stabilized approach would have had a wider circle to land procedure which I'm sure would have almost definitely ended in the collision of two aircraft over the turn to final for 33 in DCA. There was an extreme lack of communication between DCA Tower to [our flight] or DCA Tower to the associated helicopter who did not ever pop up on TCAS which I'm assuming is due to a lack of an operating transponder. No TCAS RA was associated with this event.
This occurred due to an extreme lack of communication between DCA Tower and [our flight] or DCA Tower and the associated helicopter. Otherwise the other reason this may have happened is because of an unclear idea of where aircraft should be located during Runway 33 circle to land operations. I believe I was on track with what the [company] guidelines are for that particular procedure but there is a possibility that the other traffic operating around that area may not be aware of where exactly we are located or maybe they don't have a specific guideline to keep the arriving traffic separated from the low flying helicopters.
Narrative: 2
[Report narrative contained no additional information.]
Synopsis
A CRJ-200 flight crew reported a NMAC with a helicopter on approach to Runway 33 at DCA. The crew stated the traffic call from Tower came too late to be effective.
8. ACN: 1266769Date : 201505
Narrative: 1
I am a Captain for a major carrier, and have flown in and out of DCA with that carrier for many years, much of the time being based there. I currently fly all over the US.
DCA Tower is unique in the US. They are consistent in that they are always "Climbing in my cockpit" trying to fly my aircraft. Landing there yesterday, I was told "Expect minimum time on the runway"; immediately after I landed, the controller was telling the aircraft taking the runway to "power up". They tell aircraft to taxi faster to clear exits for landing aircraft.
I understand DCA is a busy airport, I was based there for years. The military low level helicopter traffic that routinely is in the DCA traffic area complicates matters. But this is probably the most dangerous airport in the United States, strictly based on the the fact the controllers are pushing, pushing, pushing, in an attempt to handle the traffic they have.
Synopsis
Pilot reports of DCA controllers "climbing into my cockpit" and how they are telling the pilots various things that he feels they shouldn't be doing.
ACN: 1258213Date : 201504
Narrative: 1
On the Mount Vernon Visual on 11 mile final and level at 2500 ft, Potomac advised us of pop-up helicopter traffic 500 feet below our altitude. Due to the potential conflict Potomac cancelled our approach clearance and said to maintain 2500 feet. We had no traffic displayed on the TCAS at that time. A few seconds later at about 10 mile final the traffic displayed in red and we received a TCAS resolution advisory (RA) to climb. We climbed and told ATC that we were climbing due to the RA. The "climb" warning stopped after about 300 feet, we deviated about 500 (3000 MSL) in total. After the "clear of conflict" alert we returned to 2500 feet. We then asked for a new clearance to get back in sequence for arrival. I informed Potomac that I would file a report. I saw 400 feet on the TCAS as the closest distance between the two aircraft.
Narrative: 2
[Report narrative contained no additional information]
Synopsis
A320 Captain reported experiencing an NMAC with a helicopter on the Mount Vernon Approach to DCA.
ACN: 1249654Date : 201503
Narrative: 1
We were cleared to circle to and land on runway 33. ATC also added that there was a low level helicopter and that the helicopter had us in
sight. At the Wilson bridge we turned to the northeast to set ourselves up for a landing on runway 33. We continued normally and started our turn to final.
when I saw an opposite direction helicopter very close to our altitude, but slightly below us and climbing. I was about to initiate the go around
regardless of the TCAS when we got the RA. As we started the go around I saw the helicopter make an aggressive descent. We were given a
turn to the east and a climb to 2,000 feet which we complied with. After that, we cleaned up the plane, setup for another approach, and landed
on runway 1 without incident. Once we cleared the runway, ground control asked me if I wanted to call the DCA tower supervisor for an
explanation of what happened. I gladly accepted. The tower supervisor I spoke with told me a few things that explained what may have
happened. Number one, he said that the helicopters operating in that area should NEVER be above 200 feet. According to him, the helicopter
was at 800 feet, clearly not where he was supposed to be. He also explained that ATC may have taken their eyes off the helicopter for a
second because they would never expect those helicopters to do something that egregious. That seems plausible given the fact that I've
never seen a helicopter in that area at that altitude. He suggested that it was most probably a deviation on the part of the Pilot of the
helicopter, and a loss of aircraft separation that was also the fault of the helicopter pilot.
Helicopter pilots in and around DCA should adhere to ATC instructions.
Synopsis
ERJ-175 Captain reported an airborne conflict with a helicopter on approach to DCA.
