Agreed. I definitely think ATC was far too complacent.

Martin Q. Blank said:

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FireAg said:

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Man…the helo pilot says he sees the plane twice…and he asks for (and gets permission for) visual separation…

That leads on to think he was looking at the wrong aircraft…

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Yes, AAL3130.

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This is more confirmation that PAT25 was simply looking at AAL3130 who he was lined up on down the Potomac River. The CRJ was off to his left and turned into him.

Martin Q. Blank said:

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Martin Q. Blank said:

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FireAg said:

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Man…the helo pilot says he sees the plane twice…and he asks for (and gets permission for) visual separation…

That leads on to think he was looking at the wrong aircraft…

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Yes, AAL3130.

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This is more confirmation that PAT25 was simply looking at AAL3130 who he was lined up on down the Potomac River. The CRJ was off to his left and turned into him.

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By far the most plausible explanation with what we know now

Catag94 said:

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GAC06 said:

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33 is less used than 1, but I wouldn't say it's "seldom used".

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Understood. I guess what I'm saying is since it's used less, has a heli route.8 miles from the threshold, when the CRJ switched to 33, and tower knew he had a UH60 on route 4, you'd think it would have occurred to ATC that 'Hey, it's rare we actually have a potential for aircraft to meet right here. I should really watch this one'.

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You are right about that, but the unknown here is just what is `infrequent' vs rare. Whose idea of rare, or seldom, or infrequent -- the words have different intensities. It might not have been SOOO unusual that they felt need to watchdog it. But given night visibility and the multiple vectors to watch --- how does the helo know one airliner from another batch of lights? This sounds like the weak point that shipping has somewhat more solved.

GAC06 said:

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Martin Q. Blank said:

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Martin Q. Blank said:

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FireAg said:

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Man…the helo pilot says he sees the plane twice…and he asks for (and gets permission for) visual separation…

That leads on to think he was looking at the wrong aircraft…

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Yes, AAL3130.

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This is more confirmation that PAT25 was simply looking at AAL3130 who he was lined up on down the Potomac River. The CRJ was off to his left and turned into him.

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By far the most plausible explanation with what we know now

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I agree, but we still have the issue of the helo's altitude…

I've flown in DCA more times than I can remember. Always busy, always too many things going on at once: helo traffic on different military freqs, last second runways changes from 01 to 33, short runway, traffic congestion, poor low traffic visibility, rushed compressed approaches, restricted areas etc.

Very challenging with little room for error. Fortunately, the civilian aircrews are extremely professional and safe. I really can't say the same about ATC.

My guess would be that the AA RJ was rammed by the Blackhawk who was not aware of the proximity of the jet and couldn't acertain his position. This was aided by poor situational awareness by ATC in providing
separation instructions to the Blackhawk. I can't understand why ATC didn't give the Blackhawk a vector or told it to hold position until the situation was more clear. They were too close with converging paths to not make an input.

But that's just my obvious assumption with the data provided so far in the investigation.

Prayers for the victims of this crash. Warning: Speculation. Lots of probable, most likely, and maybe, Don't read if you don't want speculation. I've flown in and out of DCA. I've also flown hundred of hours with NVGs in a fixed wing.

Highly unlikely DEI contributed at all to the cause of this crash. The root cause is the congested airspace and a procedure that relies too heavily on pilot visual deconfliction with no backup. Most likely the Army pilots misidentified the aircraft they were to deconflict or "pass behind." They probably misidentified the aircraft ATC told them to pass behind...They probably focused on an aircraft 3-5 miles behind the Eagle RJ and due to various reasons could not see the RJ. When using NVGs, it greatly improves the ability to see aircraft at night but they limit peripheral vision. It helps to have more than just the pilots scanning the sky in congested airspace. Loadmasters, engineers etc normally help with this. If you polled pilots about where an accident would occur in the USA, DCA would be at the top of the list. Not to say it's dangerous but it has some built in risk that say DFW does not. Still much safer to fly than drive

Looking at the radar captures...

I think it's very clear that the Helo was 100% in a blind spot to the descending CRJ. Like others have said I think the UH60 had eyes on AAL 3130 further down river. I've never sat in a Blackhawk. I have no idea what the view is looking upwards.

Goodness, by the time ATC asks "PAT25 do you have the CRJ in sight?" the CRJ might have been squarely in a blindspot.

Simulator flying will show this when NTSB recreates everything and we can "see" what was on the pilots windshields.

I don't think we have any information on the altitude restrictions given to the helicopter. If there is, I haven't seen it. A published altitude restriction =\= what altitude the helicopter was cleared to fly at. Looking at the flight paths, appeared the 60 turned and climbed to cross the approach path for 1 near the threshold to stay clear of the plane behind the Crj. One thing nobody has mentioned yet is the controller told the helo to pass behind the inbound. The 60 pilots maneuver violated the instruction as there is no scenario where a right turn would place him behind either the aircraft he falsely identified, or the one he collided with.

My NVG experience is a decade old now and I've never flown helos but it seems crazy to me anyone would be on goggles in that environment. There are tons of lights and would render the NVG's I'm familiar with worse than useless. Maybe they have something a lot better now.

v1rotate92 said:

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Prayers for the victims of this crash. Warning: Speculation. Lots of probable, most likely, and maybe, Don't read if you don't want speculation. I've flown in and out of DCA. I've also flown hundred of hours with NVGs in a fixed wing.

Highly unlikely DEI contributed at all to the cause of this crash. The root cause is the congested airspace and a procedure that relies too heavily on pilot visual deconfliction with no backup. Most likely the Army pilots misidentified the aircraft they were to deconflict or "pass behind." They probably misidentified the aircraft ATC told them to pass behind...They probably focused on an aircraft 3-5 miles behind the Eagle RJ and due to various reasons could not see the RJ. When using NVGs, it greatly improves the ability to see aircraft at night but they limit peripheral vision. It helps to have more than just the pilots scanning the sky in congested airspace. Loadmasters, engineers etc normally help with this. If you polled pilots about where an accident would occur in the USA, DCA would be at the top of the list. Not to say it's dangerous but it has some built in risk that say DFW does not. Still much safer to fly than drive

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Informative post. On the bold ---- so what IS the way they tell one "set of airliner lights" from another? Sounds like they are content not to have one. (Ship types are usually clear).

Agreed. If PAT25 mis-identified CRJ as 3130, he passes in front of, and not behind as instructed

This right here is why I believe the 60 driver is going to be to blame. This is a pilot deviation and extremely careless mistake that killed a bunch of people.

GAC06 said:

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My NVG experience is a decade old now and I've never flown helos but it seems crazy to me anyone would be on goggles in that environment. There are tons of lights and would render the NVG's I'm familiar with worse than useless. Maybe they have something a lot better now.

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Besides being useless, with so much ambient light, would there even be a need to use them?

It was stated earlier that Route 4 has a limit of 200 feet max. Collision happened at 375 feet.

I heard on the news (from the other room, so not closely paying attention) that the helo flight was a training flight, so would make a lot more sense for the complete fumble there if it is in fact the helo's fault

Doesn't matter what the altitude restriction is on the published departure. What matters is what he was cleared to. Please understand a published departure can be deviated from with permission from ATC and is done so regularly. I'm not saying that's the case, just saying that we don't know because the clearance audio hasn't been published to my knowledge.

Tip: if starting this thread make sure to skim pages 18-21 range to be more up to date. This was a developing thing from before midnight and we learned as we went that certain causes can be ruled out.

FTAG 2000 said:

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AggieMD95 said:

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Catag94 said:

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TheCurl84 said:

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Anonymous Source said:

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Man...thanks for clearing that up. I was afraid this was the start of a new normal.

Transportation Secretary Sean Duffy: "Obviously, it is not standard to have aircraft collide. I want to be clear on that." pic.twitter.com/MtVrku3GAL

— Aaron Rupar (@atrupar) January 30, 2025

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IMO Duffy messed up in his first big test. Saying that both flight paths were "normal" is not reassuring, at all. It makes me wonder why we haven't seen more of this happen. Surely it isn't "normal" to have helicopters crossing the take-off and landing paths of flights at DCA.

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As ETFan posted earlier in this thread, here is the published "standard" helicopter routes chart for the area.
Notice the DCA airport and the close proximity of routes 1 and 4 crossing departure/approach traffic patterns of runways 1/28 and 33/15.
Also notice the altitude restriction is at or below 200'.

All this to say, the heli route is standard.

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Did collision occur at or below 200 ft ?

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375'

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Was that the actual altitude or was that displayed on the ATC scope? ATC displays the encoded value, which is the unadjusted altimeter. The altimeter itself is adjusted for the setting provided and shows a different number in the cockpit.

torrid said:

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Rockdoc said:

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I'm sorry but that helicopter should have never been on a course to cross that arrival flight path. ATC should have prevented it from taking that course. Period. It's just too busy out there.

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Juan Brown's video indicates this is a common practice. Maybe not a good one, but not unusual.

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Common practice at 200 ft not 350-400ft

fc2112 said:

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It was stated earlier that Route 4 has a limit of 200 feet max. Collision happened at 375 feet.

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Doesn't the ATC have an alert system for altitude?

Be careful about blaming ATC. We can always do more.
Those HC now have "black boxes" and we will know more soon. Also, they have TCAS. The pilot may have recieved an RA to climb and hit the RJ. All speculation until data is verified.

I have 40 years ATC experience at busy airports and have learned to not jump to conclusions.

the holes on the swiss cheese lined up. terrible.

Nobody is jumping to conclusions. This is why we say we speculate.

The Blackhawks don't have TCAS and RAs are inhibited under 3k

78669AG said:

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torrid said:

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Rockdoc said:

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I'm sorry but that helicopter should have never been on a course to cross that arrival flight path. ATC should have prevented it from taking that course. Period. It's just too busy out there.

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Juan Brown's video indicates this is a common practice. Maybe not a good one, but not unusual.

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Common practice at 200 ft not 350-400ft

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And this is much of it. Because the reverse is also true --- airliners are not supposed to come in lower than certain altitudes ever and on landing that is set as well. So a helo can reliably expect to fly safely UNDER incoming traffic if they are below a certain level and on some common courses.

torrid said:

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Patentmike said:

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VaultingChemist said:

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Army Blackhawk helicopter pilot should have flown the flight path seen in white but deviated from that approved flight plan near Reagan National Airport in DC.
Why? pic.twitter.com/878l5rZwHe

— JackReacher (@DCjusticeseeker) January 30, 2025

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Using this for the included map….

Genuine question, did the Blackhawk know runway 33 was active? I thought someone mentioned traffic was generally on runway 1 and the AA flight received permission to use 33 instead.

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Juan Brown talked about it in the video. AA plane was following a standard approach to runway 1, but then directed to take a dogleg and curve around to land on runway 33. Again, this seems to be a standard practice at least with the regional jets as they can land on the shorter 33. I'm not sure why, maybe some scheme to handle the high frequency of flights.

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United 737 was right behind AA flight. Needed longer runway for bigger aircraft

Southlake said:

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Nobody is jumping to conclusions. This is why we say we speculate.

The Blackhawks don't have TCAS and RAs are inhibited under 3k

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You might be right but the Blackhawk driver sitting next to me say some do.

There was an AA 319 behind the AA CRJ that crashed. Are you referring to the plane behind the 319?

Good question Titan. You are correct. They are content to not have one. Most of the time, it's extremely obvious the aircraft the aircraft ATC is referring to. ATC will say something like, "...a Delta airbus at your 10 Oclock 5 miles..." obviously at night you only see bright lights and depth perception is ineffective. Pilots then refer to NAV display and ID the aircraft on the moving map.

titan said:

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akaggie05 said:

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My prediction is that the last minute change to runway 33 for the CRJ will be cited as a major factor in the whole chain of events. If you've spent a lot of time at DCA you see a steady stream of traffic arriving and departing from runway 1. For all practical purposes it's essentially a single runway field. 33 is seldom used, due to short length and it also has a crossing with runway 1 itself on the ground, which causes other issues with traffic flow. My guess is that the helo pilots were used to avoiding the primary approach path for runway 1 and had watched several other jets in the patterns lined up for 1, then got somewhat lax about deviating a bit because they were still well away from where they thought all the traffic would be. Last minute change to 33 for the CRJ, poor / confusing communication about visual ID, and there you have it.

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You are probably right. This has looked like a both sides thought clear path set for them type of collision from early on and the real wild card apart from the helo being too high and off path is the change to runway 33 at just that time seems to be problematic enough that would like to know why the plane before them *refused* to accept the change that was mentioned? Was that an experienced airliner pilot that knew was risky in some way not obvious or just routine refusal?

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I refuse last minute runway changes all the time…sometimes I take them…it's a judgement call based off the situation at hand

The runway change will be a minor factor at most

AggieFlyboy said:

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titan said:

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akaggie05 said:

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My prediction is that the last minute change to runway 33 for the CRJ will be cited as a major factor in the whole chain of events. If you've spent a lot of time at DCA you see a steady stream of traffic arriving and departing from runway 1. For all practical purposes it's essentially a single runway field. 33 is seldom used, due to short length and it also has a crossing with runway 1 itself on the ground, which causes other issues with traffic flow. My guess is that the helo pilots were used to avoiding the primary approach path for runway 1 and had watched several other jets in the patterns lined up for 1, then got somewhat lax about deviating a bit because they were still well away from where they thought all the traffic would be. Last minute change to 33 for the CRJ, poor / confusing communication about visual ID, and there you have it.

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You are probably right. This has looked like a both sides thought clear path set for them type of collision from early on and the real wild card apart from the helo being too high and off path is the change to runway 33 at just that time seems to be problematic enough that would like to know why the plane before them *refused* to accept the change that was mentioned? Was that an experienced airliner pilot that knew was risky in some way not obvious or just routine refusal?

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I refuse last minute runway changes all the time…sometimes I take them…it's a judgement call based off the situation at hand

The runway change will be a minor factor at most

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Thanks. So as surmised, nothing unusual about such a refusal at all and they are routine.

v1rotate92 said:

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Good question Titan. You are correct. They are content to not have one. Most of the time, it's extremely obvious the aircraft the aircraft ATC is referring to. ATC will say something like, "...a Delta airbus at your 10 Oclock 5 miles..." obviously at night you only see bright lights and depth perception is ineffective. Pilots then refer to NAV display and ID the aircraft on the moving map.

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Hmmm. There is the place they may want to look at then. Not so much as to assign blame, but going forward this will only get worse around the world in some ways, so start coming up with ways where the IDs are known at night as well to even the smallest of aircraft. (Wartime of course excepted----any rationale realizes safety disappears in war zones--ships douse lights as well)

Had the Helo known "what ATC was talking about" they could have just made a quick visual check and responded. But they misunderstood --- that seems now more than 90% likely.

cringe